Legal framework on freedom of religion and actual application
Sunni Muslims represent approximately 84.7 to 89.7 percent of the Afghan population. The rest are mostly Shi‘a Muslims (10 to 15 percent), who are mainly ethnic Hazara. The country’s former constitution officially recognised 14 ethnic groups, including the Pashtun, Tajiks, and Hazaras. The Pashtun make up the largest group (estimated at 42 percent of the population), followed by Tajiks (about 27 percent), Hazaras (9 percent), Uzbeks (9 percent), Turkmen (3 percent), Baluchis (2 percent), with the other groups making up the remaining 8 percent.[1]
The Taliban returned to power in 2021, more than 20 years after they were ousted. The consequent establishment of an Islamic emirate has completely changed the country’s legal framework. The 2004 Constitution of the Republic of Afghanistan[2] is no longer in force under the current Taliban regime. Despite multiple statements from the de facto authorities expressing their intention to draft and enact a new constitution, no such document has been introduced so far.
Under the first emirate (1996-2001), a ulema council drafted a constitution aimed at formalising the establishment of an Islamic emirate, but it was never approved. The charter was largely based on the 1964 Constitution adopted under former King Mohammed Zahir Sha, which provided for a constitutional monarchy, democratic elections, separation of powers, and a Bill of Rights as a limit to state powers, all of which are rejected by the Taliban.[3]
Although the Taliban declared in September 2021 that they intended to temporarily apply the old charter, in practice, they did not.[4]
Despite initial promises of inclusivity, the Taliban regime became increasingly exclusionary, favouring southern Pashtun Taliban members over political representation of other groups. The Supreme Leader, Emir Haibatullah Akhundzada, has further consolidated and centralised authority.[5]
In May 2022, the Taliban published a 312-page manifesto entitled “Al Imarat al Islamiah wa Nizamuha” (The Islamic Emirate and its Order).[6] Authored by Taliban Chief Justice Abdul Hakim Haqqani, it is based on the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence, which is followed by the country’s Sunni majority. Clearly impacting the Shi‘a minority, this constitutes a step backwards compared to the 2004 constitution, which was the first in the country’s history to recognise a limited role for the Jaʿfarī Shi‘a School of Jurisprudence.[7]
From a judicial point of view, the Taliban have shown little or no regard for the due process of law. For example, important appointments and decrees in the administrative, legislative and judicial spheres have been issued under the authority of the supreme leader, the emir, without consideration for the separation of powers, many laws are laid down through decrees that are not properly communicated and, in some cases, a statement by a group leader is sufficient for a decree to become effective. Since August 2021, the Taliban have issued approximately one hundred edicts and decrees, significantly restricting human rights, with a particularly severe impact on women and religious minorities.[8]
A further challenge is that it is not uncommon for local officials to administer swift justice, sometimes without a proper trial. Penalties can range from public shaming to corporal punishment and even relatively minor offences such as theft are punished by the amputation of limbs. The most severe cases, including crimes such as apostasy and blasphemy, can result in execution. For instance, in February 2022, a young woman and a man were stoned to death for alleged adultery in the northeastern province of Badakhshan, according to two local sources and a Taliban official.[9]
The death penalty for crimes such as apostasy and blasphemy remains in place, while the Taliban first announced and then implemented extreme forms of punishment even for minor offences, such as amputation of limbs in case of theft.[10]
The Taliban have also undertaken a rapid restructuring of Afghanistan’s justice system. One of the most significant changes was the dissolution of the Attorney General’s Office in July 2023, effectively eliminating the role of public prosecutors. As a result, judges now oversee all aspects of legal proceedings, from case assignment to sentencing, without the investigative support traditionally provided by prosecutors.[11] The absence of a written constitution and formal legal codes exacerbates concerns over arbitrary interpretations of the law and the heightened risk of miscarriages of justice.[12]
The Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (MPVPV) serves as the primary authority responsible for issuing most directives and operates with approximately 5,000 agents.[13] This ministry, which includes a notoriously violent hardline Islamist policing system, was disbanded in 2001 but re-established in September 2021 replacing the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. Through its directives, the MPVPV enforces provisions it deems obligatory for all Afghans, either because they are Muslim or, in the case of non-Muslims, subjects of a Muslim state.[14]
On 8 November 2023, the Law on Complaints Hearing was approved, outlining the responsibilities of the MPVPV in handling complaints against government officials. The law mandates that all state institutions, including courts, must respond to inquiries from the ministry. Furthermore, in cases of serious or unresolved complaints, the ministry is authorised to escalate the matter directly to the Taliban leadership.[15]
Additionally, in August 2024, a Law on the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice was issued, comprising a preface, four sections, and 35 articles. Article 6.1 of the law establishes the authority of the Ministry of Promotion of Virtue, Prohibition of Vice, and Hearing of Complaints.[16] Article 23 stipulates that: “An enforcer is duty-bound to prevent minorities living under an Islamic government and asylum-seekers from open perpetration of wrongful acts.”[17] Richard Bennett, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Afghanistan, underscored that, beyond mandating religious practices for Muslims, the law also imposes restrictions on the observance of non-Islamic religions. For instance, it prohibits the wearing of crucifixes and other “un-Islamic” symbols and bans celebrations that have no foundation in Islam.[18]
Article 13.3 of the Law on the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice stipulates that, in addition to covering their bodies and faces entirely, a woman’s voice “in a song, a hymn, or a recital out loud in a gathering” must be concealed, effectively prohibiting women from being seen or heard in public.[19]
Since August 2021, the Taliban have issued a series of decrees restricting women’s rights, including their freedom of movement, dress, participation in sports, access to employment and education, and healthcare.[20] In May 2022, the de facto authorities issued the hijab decree, mandating that women and girls must be fully covered in public. This decree has been strictly enforced, particularly in the first half of 2024, through intensified crackdowns and increased inspections.[21]
Women have been excluded from most sectors of the workforce,[22] while other measures have severely impacted women’s rights, specifically targeting education. In March 2022, the Taliban ruled that girls’ schools beyond the sixth grade would remain closed. Later, in December of the same year, the Minister for Higher Education officially suspended university education for female students until further notice.[23] In February 2023, the Afghanistan Medical Council barred female graduates from taking their final exams. Most recently, in December 2024, the Deputy Minister of Public Health issued a verbal directive instructing all medical institutions to prohibit women and girls from pursuing studies at their facilities.[24]
Restrictions have also been imposed on women’s religious practices. In April 2023, the Department for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (DPVPV) – a local enforcement body operating at the provincial and district levels under the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (MPVPV) – verbally instructed the police in Kandahar to ban women from visiting cemeteries and shrines, labelling the practice as “un-Islamic”.[25]
Additionally, thousands of Afghan girls, barred from formal education, have been forced to turn to religious schools (madrasas) as their only available option for learning. According to testimonies from female students, the curriculum in these institutions often incorporates extremist ideologies and places significant emphasis on domestic roles, instructing girls on how to raise their children as holy warriors (mujahidin) and how to “serve” their husbands.[26]
The Taliban Ministry of Education currently oversees more than 21,000 religious schools, including jihadi schools, four times more than under the previous Afghan government, far more than the 18,000 public and private schools.[27] The expansion of madrasas, some of which actively advocate militant jihad, has fundamentally transformed Afghanistan’s education system, raising concerns about the long-term implications for national development and the potential risk of fostering radicalisation.[28] Rather than serving solely as educational institutions, these madrasas function as centres of indoctrination and potential recruitment hubs for extremist groups.[29]
The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) also expressed particular concern about the impunity with which the country’s de facto authorities appear to have committed human rights violations. Between 1 October and 31 December 2024, it documented cases of judicial corporal punishment, affecting at least 194 individuals, including 150 men, 39 women, four boys, and one girl.[30]
In his latest report on Afghanistan, released on 21 February 2025, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres emphasised the urgent need to halt the implementation of corporal punishment and expressed deep concern over the continued use of the death penalty, particularly in cases involving individuals who were under the age of 18 at the time of their alleged offences.[31]
Since the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021, at least five individuals have been publicly executed following rulings by the de facto judicial system and with the approval of the Taliban leader.[32]
The UNAMA Human Rights Service has also documented multiple instances of physical assault and religious repression by the DPVPV against individuals whose beliefs diverge from those imposed by the ruling authorities.[33]
The UNAMA’s report, titled “De Facto Authorities Moral Oversight in Afghanistan: Impacts on Human Rights” (May 2024), includes, as an annex, responses from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’s Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue, Prevention of Vice, and Complaints Hearing. Regarding regulations on religious practices, the de facto authorities assert that “each order of the Islamic Shari‘a system and politics is not devoid of wisdom; Muslims must carry them out, and the ruling regime must take all necessary steps to ensure that its performance is guaranteed.”[34]
Regarding the prohibition of non-Islamic celebrations, the report argues that “Islam is a complete and all-encompassing religion that offers guidelines and precepts for its followers to follow in every area of life. There are two Eids [that are allowed to be celebrated in Islam], and it is a violation of freedom [to celebrate other days]; therefore, we can say that celebration of those matters that you have mentioned is prohibited; hence, its proposed aspects are also prohibited, and this is an accepted legal principle.”[35]
The Taliban also banned music, as their spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid noted in 2021: “Music is forbidden in Islam.”[36] In January 2023, the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice confirmed an order banning poetry with a musical metre.[37] Later, on 11 June 2023, the ministry extended restrictions by prohibiting the playing of music at weddings and other celebrations, instructing wedding halls to enforce compliance. UNAMA has documented multiple cases of enforcement, including instances of ill-treatment, arbitrary arrests, and detentions of individuals accused of violating the music ban.[38]
Afghanistan’s media landscape has also experienced severe repression, with journalists facing arbitrary arrests, threats, and violence. Many media outlets have been forced to shut down or operate under strict censorship, resulting in a significant decline in press freedom. The Afghanistan Journalists Center documented 181 violations of media rights in 2024, with 18 media outlets shut down and 50 journalists detained as a result of new restrictions.[39]
In January 2025, the International Criminal Court (ICC) Chief Prosecutor, Karim Khan, sought arrest warrants for Taliban Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada and Chief Justice Abdul Hakim Haqqani. They are accused of crimes against humanity, specifically the systematic persecution of women and girls in Afghanistan.[40]
Incidents and developments
According to United Nations data, out of the country’s 46 million inhabitants, more than 22.9 million require humanitarian assistance.[41]
Although civilian casualties have significantly decreased in Afghanistan since the Taliban’s takeover on 15 August 2021, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) continues to document high levels of civilian harm, primarily resulting from deliberate attacks involving improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
Between August 2021 and May 2023, UNAMA recorded 3,774 civilian casualties, including 1,095 deaths and 2,679 wounded. Most casualties were caused by indiscriminate attacks in crowded areas with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) (2,814: 701 killed and 2,113 wounded), like places of worship, schools, and markets.[42] Among the victims were 233 women (92 killed, 141 wounded) and 866 children (287 killed, 579 wounded). Other major causes of civilian harm included explosive remnants of war (639 casualties) and targeted killings (148 victims).[43]
In a report dated August 2024, UN Special Rapporteur Richard Bennett expressed concern over the Taliban’s ongoing violations of minorities’ freedom of religion and cultural rights, citing measures such as the banning of religious celebrations, the removal of Shi‘a-related books from libraries, and the prohibition of translating scientific works into Uzbek and Turkish.[44]
A report by the Afghan human rights organisation Rawadari highlights systematic discrimination by the Taliban against ethnic and religious minorities. The organisation has documented biased policies in government services, resource allocation, employment, and humanitarian aid distribution, disproportionately affecting vulnerable ethnic and religious communities. Furthermore, they have suppressed religious diversity, imposed severe restrictions on religious freedoms, and, in some cases, coerced religious minorities into conversion.[45]
Hazaras are the most persecuted minority, already targeted during the previous period of Taliban rule.[46] The Hazaras, mostly Shi‘a Muslims, are Afghanistan’s third-largest ethnic group, following the Pashtun and Tajiks. During the period under review, they suffered numerous attacks by both the Taliban and the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP).
The Hazara Shi‘a community remains the primary target of ISKP attacks against minority groups. Despite losses in leadership and territory, the ISKP continues to pose a significant threat in Afghanistan, exploiting sectarian divisions and frequently targeting religious minorities and other vulnerable populations.[47]
In October and November 2023, two attacks targeted the Hazara Shi‘a minority in Dasht-e-Barchi, a predominantly Shi‘a neighbourhood in Kabul, occurring just days apart. The ISKP claimed responsibility for both incidents.[48] The first attack took place on 26 October 2023, when an explosion at a boxing club killed four people.[49] In the second attack, on 7 November 2023, a bomb detonated on a minibus carrying Hazara Shi‘a passengers, resulting in seven deaths and 20 injuries.[50]
Two additional attacks occurred in January 2024 in the same neighbourhood.[51] On 6 January 2024, an explosion targeted a minibus, killing five people and wounding 15. A few days later, on 11 January 2024, a grenade attack outside a commercial centre resulted in two deaths and 12 injuries.[52] The ISKP claimed responsibility for the first attack, while the second remains unclaimed, however, the ISKP is strongly suspected of being behind it. Islamic State spokesman, Abu Hudhayfah Al-Ansari, stated that these attacks are part of the group’s new global campaign, titled “Kill Them Wherever You Find Them,” a reference to a verse from Surat Al-Baqarah.[53]
This campaign also includes the suicide bombing on 13 October 2023, which killed seven worshippers at the Imam Zaman Shi’ite Mosque in Pul-e-Khumri, the capital of Baghlan province in northern Afghanistan, during Friday prayers,[54] and the 29 April 2024 attack on a Shi’a Mosque in Herat’s Guzara district, which resulted in six fatalities. Both attacks were claimed by ISKP.[55]
The group is suspected to be behind two additional attacks in 2024, although it has not claimed responsibility for either. On 20 April 2024, a bomb detonated on a car in Kabul’s Kot-e-Sangi neighbourhood, killing the driver and injuring three people.[56] Similarly, on 11 August 2024, a bomb exploded on a minibus in Dasht-e-Barchi, resulting in one death and 11 wounded.[57]
The ISKP also claimed responsibility for the 12 September 2024 attack involving the ambush of villagers from Ghor and Daykundi provinces who went to greet pilgrims returning from a religious journey to Karbala (Iraq), killing 14 and wounding six.[58]
As in the past, the Hazara community continues to face persecution also under Taliban rule with the Taliban imposing numerous restrictions on Shi‘a worshippers. One of the most severe forms of discrimination is forced evictions.[59] In mid-2024, the Taliban ordered Hazara residents in Nowabad, Ghazni City, to present title deeds to their land, a process that ultimately led to their displacement. The authorities claimed the land was government-owned and unlawfully occupied even though the Hazaras had legally purchased it.[60]
Additionally, since the Taliban’s return to power, Hazaras have been systematically removed from government positions, significantly curtailing their role in governance and restricting their access to resources.[61]
In February 2023, Taliban authorities in Nusay district, in Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province, issued a decree prohibiting marriages between Shi‘a and Sunni Muslims. This decision was justified on religious and ideological grounds.[62] In April 2023, the authorities declared Eid Al-Fitr on 21 April 2023, despite this date being the last day of Ramadan according to the Shi‘a calendar. In Daikundi province, members of the Shi‘a community were forced to break their fast at police checkpoints, and at least 25 individuals were beaten for refusing to comply.[63]
In July 2023, the Council of Shi‘a Scholars of Afghanistan issued a statement urging mourners to limit their activities during Muharram, the first month of the Islamic calendar. This guidance was issued in response to the Taliban-imposed restrictions. Prior to the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, Afghan Shi‘a communities were able to commemorate Muharram freely, organising large-scale processions featuring religious songs and rituals. The newly imposed limitations sparked opposition from Shi’a leaders, who regard them as an infringement on their religious practices.[64]
In December 2023, the Taliban Ministry of Higher Education instructed private universities and higher educational institutions to remove books deemed “contradictory to Hanafi jurisprudence, political, or a challenge to faith” from their libraries. Reinforcing this directive, Taliban Minister of Higher Education, Neda Mohammad Nadim, declared that “Afghanistan has no sects” and that the entire country adheres to Hanafi jurisprudence.[65]
Subsequently, in June 2024, the Taliban Directorate of Education in Bamyan ordered schools to remove Ja’fari jurisprudence books from their curricula, stating that new textbooks incorporating both Sunni and Shi‘a traditions would be developed and distributed. However, as of January 2025, no such materials have been introduced.[66]
Sufi Muslims were also targeted during the period under review. The group has played an important spiritual role in Afghanistan for centuries, but now their vision is in sharp conflict with that of the Taliban and the ISKP. On 22 November 2024, a deadly attack occurred at the Sayed Padshah Agha shrine in Nahrin district, Baghlan province. Unidentified gunmen opened fire on a gathering of Sufi worshippers during a nightly Zikr (devotional prayer) session, killing at least 10 individuals. The ISKP claimed responsibility for the attack.[67] This attack followed three brutal assaults in 2022, which collectively resulted in over a hundred casualties.[68]
The Ahmadi community faces a similarly dire fate. Already persecuted under the previous Taliban regime, they are deemed blasphemers and are not regarded as true Muslims. Before August 2021, they were estimated to be around 450 nationwide, but their current number is unknown. Some Ahmadis were allegedly detained by the Taliban, as reported by the Ahmadiyya Press Office. Ahmadi Caliph Hazrat Mirza Masroor reportedly said: “Ahmadi Muslims in Afghanistan are undergoing extreme difficulties and some have even been detained”.[69] In another statement, he asserted that: “Extremists like the Taliban and others are tarnishing the name of Islam and have already come under the grip of God.”[70]
Christianity is seen as a western religion and alien to Afghanistan. Even before the Taliban seizure of power, Christians reported how public opinion, on social media and elsewhere, was hostile towards converts to Christianity. Afghan Christians used to worship alone or in small groups in private homes.[71] After seizing power, the Taliban asserted that they would protect religious minorities but made no mention of Christians. The group has publicly stated: “There are no Christians in Afghanistan. A Christian minority has never been known or officially registered here.”[72]
According to some reports, the Taliban have placed bounties on Afghan Christians, offering monetary rewards to individuals who report them. This development has further heightened the dangers faced by Christians, who are already forced to practise their faith in secrecy.[73] For the first time in a century, Afghanistan was left without a Catholic church when the Taliban seized control. Father Giovanni Scalese, a Barnabite priest and Superior of the Missio sui iuris in Afghanistan – present in the country since 1921 – was forced to return to Italy on 26 August 2021. In an interview in May 2024, Father Scalese, who had been the only Catholic priest in Afghanistan for seven years, expressed his frustration over the lack of global attention to the country, urging international organisations to resume their efforts in providing assistance to those in need.[74]
A major concern for those Afghan Christians who have sought refuge in Pakistan is the Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan, introduced by the Pakistani government in October 2023. This policy lacks specific protections for religious minorities and specifically targets undocumented foreign nationals, with a particular focus on Afghan refugees, placing them at serious risk of deportation.[75]
In July 2023, a short film produced by Christian Solidarity Worldwide documented the plight of Hazara Christians in Pakistan, who are forced to live in hiding to avoid deportation or, in the worst cases, lynching due to their faith.[76]
On 7 August 2024, Pope Francis met with the Afghan Community Association in Italy, expressing deep sorrow over the immense suffering in Afghanistan. He also condemned the misuse of religion, stating that faith must never be exploited to justify hatred or violence.[77]
According to civil society groups, approximately 150 Sikhs and Hindus still lived in the country in late 2021, down from 400 at the start of the year, and 1,300 in 2017.[78] As of 2022, only 100 Hindus and Sikhs were believed to have remained in the country.[79]
Even before the new Taliban regime came to power, Sikh temples had been the target of attacks, often claimed by the ISKP, such as that which occurred on 25 March 2020 at a gurdwara in Kabul killing 25 people.[80]
In October 2023, the Kabul Municipality announced that the Taliban had appointed a representative for the Hindu and Sikh communities in Kabul to advocate for their rights, particularly in reclaiming seized properties.[81] In April 2024, a Taliban representative reiterated the regime’s commitment to protecting the property rights of Hindus and Sikhs.[82]
Despite the Taliban’s apparent willingness to facilitate their return, Hindus and Sikhs remain fearful of going back to Afghanistan, as they previously faced severe restrictions under Taliban rule, including limitations on their appearance and bans on publicly observing their religious holidays.[83]
No Jews are known to have remained in Afghanistan. By the end of the 20th century, nearly the entire Jewish community had emigrated to Israel, driven by worsening security conditions. Following the Taliban takeover, Zebulon Simentov, believed to be the last remaining Jew in the country, initially chose to stay. However, in September 2021, he ultimately left Kabul, marking the end of Afghanistan’s Jewish presence.[84]
There is no available data on Bahá’ís in Afghanistan. The community has lived in relative anonymity, particularly following the 2007 declaration by the General Directorate of Fatwas and Accounts of the Supreme Court of Afghanistan that deemed the Bahá’í faith to be blasphemous and its followers infidels.[85]
Uyghur Muslims, who number around 2,000, are another endangered group. Given the Taliban’s close relations with China, which the new regime described as their “main partner” to rebuild Afghanistan,[86] the Uyghur now fear for both their lives in Afghanistan and possible repatriation and persecution in China.[87]
Prospects for freedom of religion
In a context of almost complete isolation and with little recourse to law, ethnic and religious minorities in Afghanistan experience a twofold suffering: systemic discrimination and persecution by the Taliban, and violent attacks by the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP).
The escalating human rights violations committed by the country’s de facto authorities as outlined in this report – not exhaustive given the sheer volume of incidents – paints an extremely negative and alarming picture for religious freedom in Afghanistan.
Coupled with this, despite the Taliban’s attempts to contain the ISKP, atrocities committed by the jihadi group do not appear to have lessened. Instead, the ISKP has adapted its strategy, shifting from territorial control to urban warfare. This transformation includes a decentralised internal structure and a less hierarchical system, aimed at undermining the Taliban’s legitimacy in the eyes of the local population.[88]
The combination of these factors indicates that the outlook for religious freedom in Afghanistan remains deeply concerning and overwhelmingly negative.
Sources
Afghanistan