Legal framework on freedom of religion and actual application
The constitutional status of religious freedom in Bangladesh is highly ambivalent. On the one hand, the 1972 constitution (revised in 2014)[1] states: “Subject to law, public order and morality, every citizen has the right to profess, practice, or propagate any religion” and “every religious community or denomination has the right to establish, maintain and manage its religious institutions” (Article 41, 1, a and b). On the other hand, the same document simultaneously makes Islam the state religion while also explicitly recognising “secularism” as a basic constitutional principle.
Specifically, the preamble and Article 8 both define secularism as a high ideal and a fundamental principle of state policy. Article 12 – suspended in the past, but restored in June 2011 under the 15th Amendment – makes clear that the principle of secularism implies the elimination of communalism, of favouritism by the State towards any religion, of the abuse of religion for political purposes and of discrimination against those of a particular religion.[2] At the same time, Article 2a states that the “State religion of the Republic is Islam,” adding the proviso that “the State shall ensure equal status and equal rights in the practice of the Hindu, Buddhist, Christian and other religions.”[3]
This apparent contradiction was confirmed in 2016. On 28 March, the High Court (a division of the Supreme Court) upheld the status of Islam as the state religion, refusing to give a hearing to petitioners who wished to remove this provision of the constitution.[4]
In April 2024, the High Court again upheld this constitutional provision, ruling that it did not conflict with the country’s secular principles.[5] The court clarified that secularism, as enshrined in the constitution, is not defined by the exclusion of religion from the State, but rather by the protection of freedom of religion and the prevention of religious favouritism.
The ruling responded to a 1988 writ petition filed by 15 citizens who contended that the constitutional amendment establishing Islam as the state religion was incompatible with Bangladesh’s founding secular ideals. The petition was ultimately dismissed on procedural grounds, with the court citing a lack of legal standing on the part of the petitioners.[6]
Unlike Pakistan, Bangladesh does not have a blasphemy law. However, the colonial-era Penal Code of 1860 (Article 298) criminalises the intentional wounding of religious feelings.[7] In 2016, Bangladesh passed an Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Act, toughened by the government of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in 2013, under which it is illegal to publish content on the internet that could “harm public order and the law” or be construed as defamation against religions.[8] This law has been used to imprison journalists, students, and teachers.
The Digital Security Act (DSA) of October 2018[9] gave the police the power to detain people without a warrant.[10] An average of 147 people were sued and 67 arrested under the DSA in each of the 11 months preceding February 2022, according to a report by the Centre for Governance Studies (CGS).[11] Those targeted were mainly activists, journalists, and others critical of the government.[12] In 2023, Sheikh Hasina’s government repealed the DSA to replace it with the Cyber Security Act (CSA). Although government officials stated that “as a result, no media persons will be harassed by the proposed Cyber Security Act”[13], critics claimed the law was still used to stifle freedom of expression.[14]
In November 2024, the Chief Adviser’s Press Secretary, Shafiqul Alam, announced that the CSA would be repealed, acknowledging that it had indeed been used to harass individuals from minority communities. In its place, the government proposed the Cyber Protection Ordinance 2024, which aims to address cybercrime while safeguarding freedom of expression.[15] However, civil society organisations and human rights groups continue to raise concerns that the draft ordinance retains restrictive provisions that could continue to be used to suppress dissent.[16]
Bangladesh is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).[17]
Incidents and developments
Bangladesh broke free from Pakistan in 1971 and, ever since, has wrestled with the question of its fundamental identity. Today the country is in a more ambivalent and conflicted position than at any time since its independence.
While Sunni Islam occupies a major place in the country’s sense of self-identity, many Bangladeshis are also proud of its tolerant and moderate traditions. In 1972, Bangladesh adopted a constitution based on a linguistic and secular identity. In 1988 however, a military regime led by Lieutenant-General Hussein Muhammad Ershad changed the constitution to make Islam the state religion. Since then, a powerful political and intellectual movement has sought to strengthen secularism, while an opposing movement has promoted Islamisation.
In January 2024, Sheikh Hasina, head of the Awami League, became Prime Minister of Bangladesh for the fourth time. Critics claimed that she had rigged the election and used coercion against the opposition. On 6 June 2024, a day after the High Court of Bangladesh reinstated the controversial job quota system (favouring descendants of those who fought in the 1971 independence war), student protests took place. On 5 August 2024, Sheikh Hasina fled to India as protestors entered her residence to demand her resignation. An interim government was formed, installing Nobel Peace Prize winner, and founder of the Grameen Bank, Muhammad Yunus as Chief Adviser (interim head of government).[18] Asked to set an election date, Yunus said that if “political parties agree to hold an earlier date with minimum reforms, such as having a flawless voter list, the election could be held by the end of 2025”.[19]
Throughout the years leading up to and following the 2024 overthrow of the Awami League, a conflict between secularists and Islamists continues unabated with ambivalent consequences for religious freedom at both political and societal levels. With the election of the Awami League under Sheikh Hasina in 2009, the government had sought to curb Islamist influences in society and politics, which in theory increased the security of religious minorities as well as social and civic space for religious freedom. Nevertheless, secularist policies themselves also often violated religious freedom and other civil liberties, and their intransigence fuelled a social and political polarisation as well as what appears to be an intensifying Islamist backlash. For example, the government’s prosecution of Islamist leaders for war crimes drew criticism from international observers for failing to protect the rights of defendants, as well as provoking intense domestic hostility from religious conservatives and opponents of the Awami League.[20]
Following Sheikh Hasina’s departure to India, striking back at these efforts by the Awami League, Islamist militants initiated a massive and violent campaign targeting secular bloggers, human rights activists and religious minorities. Religious minorities including Hindus and Christians were attacked because it was assumed they had supported the Awami League. For example, during the protests of August 2024, fifteen Hindu temples were vandalised, looted, and burned across 45 districts in the country and the offices of the Catholic relief agency Caritas Bangladesh in the Southwest of the country were also attacked.[21] Although the interim government has denied discriminating against minorities[22], indicators reveal that religious freedom violations are on the increase.
In March 2023, an attack by the radical Islamist group, Majlis-e Tahaffuz-e-Khatm-e-Nobuwat Bangladesh, responsible for previous attacks against the minority Ahmadi Muslims, targeted the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community’s 98th Annual Convention in Ahmednagar, Panchagarh district. The mob looted, vandalised, and set fire to Ahmadi homes, businesses, and a mosque, causing extensive damage.[23] Jahid Hasan, a 25-year-old Ahmadi Muslim, was fatally beaten while trying to protect the area. The attack destroyed 189 homes, 50 shops, and a medical clinic in Darul Wahid Mohalla. Signs of escalation had been reported on 2 March 2023, with groups targeting Ahmadi homes and graveyards, suggesting an effort to instil fear. Local authorities were widely criticised for their inaction despite prior assurances of protection, and police failed to intervene until too late.[24]
On 4 November 2023, Selim Khan, a 19-year-old atheist blogger, was arrested and denied bail. Even after the court ordered bail in March 2024, Mr Khan remained in custody due to “procedural delays”.[25]
On 16 July 2024, the interim government ordered schools and colleges to close after six students were killed in protests over civil service hiring policies.[26]
In July 2024, the Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council (BHBCUC) presented its annual report, which recorded 1,045 cases of human rights violations against religious and ethnic minorities between July 2023 and June 2024, resulting in 45 deaths. The BHBCUC underscored the urgent need for measures to protect minority rights and ensure the prosecution of perpetrators, as well as advocating for strengthened efforts to foster social harmony and peaceful coexistence.[27]
On 5 August, attackers targeted Ahmadiyya Muslims in Ahmednagar, a village in the Panchagarh district, beating the men, looting houses and burning 117 homes. Other Ahmadiyya locations in Rangpur, Rajshahi, Nipharmari, Shahpur, and Dhaka were also attacked in the same month.[28]
On 28 August 2024, the interim government officially lifted the ban on the Islamist political party Jamaat-e-Islami and its student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir. According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, the decision was based on the lack of evidence linking the groups to terrorist activities. Citing Section 18 of the 2009 Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) as its authorisation, the government revoked a previous order issued on 1 August 2024 by the former Awami League-led administration, which had banned both groups. The decision took immediate effect, signalling a policy shift toward political inclusivity and legal redress.[29]
August 2024 marked the seventh anniversary of the displacement of some 700,000 Rohingya from their homes in Myanmar. Living in crowded refugee camps, they are still unable to return to their country as they have no guarantee of safety there.[30] In 2024, children accounted for half of the more than 7,000 Rohingya leaving Bangladesh and Myanmar by boat in the hope of reaching Malaysia or Indonesia.[31]
Bangladeshi authorities have accepted nearly a million mostly Muslim Rohingya who have fled neighbouring Myanmar since August 2017. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that their situation is untenable, partly because of violence by Islamic militants and gangs involved in drug dealing and human trafficking.[32] In March 2025, a report revealed that serious human rights abuses were also being committed by Rohingya militant groups operating within refugee camps in Bangladesh. The report – documenting killings, abductions, torture, and threats – found “reasonable grounds” to believe that these acts, which may constitute war crimes, were linked to recruitment for the ongoing armed conflict in Myanmar.[33]
Local Christian ethnic groups have also grown increasingly fearful for their safety due to a rise in violence in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). The area has become unstable due to a state-sponsored influx of landless Bengali Muslims, and a proliferation of armed rebel groups. Numerous arson attacks and the killing of some 23 members of ethnic minority groups in the last year have left many residents worried about the future. “We are the locals, but today we do not have any security, neither at home nor outside,” stated one Catholic resident. “Often, we do not know who is killing whom, when and why. The CHT has become a turbulent place.”[34]
In September 2024, an anti-insurgency drive put pressure on the Christian-majority Bawm people in the CHT region. Earlier in the year, authorities had ordered the Bawm to carry identification documents when they left their homes. The authorities also launched an attack on the Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF), which aims to establish an autonomous state for the Bawn and is widely regarded as a protector of the rights of tribes in the area, including the Bawm. Sixteen people were killed in the area amid heightened security measures against the KNF. Some community members said that arrests took place which had little to do with the insurgency. More than 140 Bawm have been detained by security forces.[35]
The growing influence of Islamist groups such as Jamaat-e-Islami has also led to increasing hostility towards Christians, who face employment discrimination and delays in church construction approvals. Catholic schools have seen incidents of vandalism and arson, along with demands for the implementation of Islamic dress codes and the replacement of Christian administrators.[36]
In October 2024, 18 Hindus were charged with sedition after holding a rally in Chattogram (formerly Chittagong) to press for a ministry for minorities. Chinmony Krishna Das Brahmachari, a Hindu monk and former ISKCON (International Society for Krishna Consciousness) religious leader, was arrested the following month on a sedition charge because he participated in the rally. The case was lodged under the country’s 1860 Penal Code.[37]
In October 2024, a revered Sufi shrine in Dewanbag was set alight, injuring four people. Earlier, in August 2024, a Sufi shrine in Sonargaon had been attacked and burned to ashes.[38]
In January 2025, the Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council (BHBCUC) accused the interim government of Muhammad Yunus, of failing to protect religious and ethnic minorities from violence and harassment. It reported 174 incidents between 21 August and 31 December 2024, resulting in 23 deaths and nine rapes among minority communities, alongside cases of arson, vandalism, and looting. The government disputed these claims, attributing the incidents to political motives rather than religious or ethnic tensions.[39]
In January 2025, the Auxiliary Bishop of Dhaka, Subroto Boniface Gomes, described the relationship between the Catholic Church and Bangladesh’s new interim government as “good”. However, he emphasised the importance of including Christian representatives, regardless of denomination, in the six newly established reform commissions, which are tasked with reviewing key sectors such as the electoral system, judiciary, police, anti-corruption, public administration, and the constitution.[40]
Prospects for freedom of religion
The ongoing social and political instability in Bangladesh means that there is still no stable foundation for religious freedom. While the former government of the secularist Awami League imposed restrictions on human rights, including religious freedom, concerns have emerged that the current interim government led by Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus may be enabling an increased Islamist influence. The decision to lift the ban on Jamaat-e-Islami and its student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir, appears to signal such a shift. It remains to be seen how the new government will approach these issues following upcoming elections.
Meanwhile, minority communities continue to call for greater inclusion in governance. The plight of the Rohingya remains unresolved as they continue to endure precarious conditions in overcrowded camps and face multiple forms of violence. In the face of these developments, the outlook for religious freedom in Bangladesh appears increasingly negative.
Sources
Bangladesh