BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
Legal framework on freedom of religion and actual application
In 1995, the General Framework Agreement for Peace, commonly known as the Dayton Agreement, was signed in Paris, ending three years of conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). This accord established BiH as a State comprising two primary entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, predominantly inhabited by Catholic Croats and Muslim Bosniaks in the western and central regions, and the Republika Srpska, primarily home to Orthodox Serbs in the North and East. Each entity possesses its own president, government, parliament, and police force.[1] Additionally, the Brčko District, located in north-eastern BiH, was established in 1999 as a self-governing administrative unit jointly administered by both entities.[2] The central government operates under a rotating three-member presidency, as outlined in Article V of the BiH Constitution, which is annexed as Annex IV of the Dayton Agreement.[3]
According to the last census in 2013, the population of BiH was composed of 50.1 percent Bosniaks, 30.8 percent Serbs, 15.4 percent Croats, and 3.7 percent others.[4] Most BiH citizens self-identify with one of the country’s three main ethnic groups: Croatians are predominantly Catholic, Serbs are mainly Orthodox and Bosniaks are mostly Muslim.[5]
The “Law on Freedom of Religion and the Legal Position of Churches and Religious Communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, enacted in 2004, establishes the separation of Church and State (Article 14).[6] It guarantees freedom of religion (Article 4.1), ensures the legal status of Churches and religious communities (Article 2.3), and prohibits discrimination against any religious group (Article 2.1). The law also delineates the relationship between the State and religious groups (Chapter IV).
Article 16(1) mandates the Ministry of Justice to maintain a register of all religious groups, while the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees is responsible for documenting violations of religious freedom (Article 17). The law recognises four traditional religious communities and Churches: The Islamic Community, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church and the Jewish Community (Article 8, 2). Any group of 300 adults may apply in writing to the Ministry of Justice to register as a new Church or religious community (Article 18.1,2). The Ministry is required to issue a decision within 30 days, with the possibility of appeal to the Council of Ministers.[7]
The law reaffirms the right to religious education, assigning to official representatives of various Churches and religious communities the responsibility of teaching religious studies in all state and private educational institutions, including kindergartens, primary schools, and higher-level establishments (Article 4.1).[8]
The Basic Agreement between the Holy See and Bosnia and Herzegovina was signed on 19 April 2006, and came into effect on 25 October 2007.[9] The agreement recognises the public juridical personality of the Catholic Church (Article 2) and grants several rights, including the right to establish schools (Article 14.1) and charities (Article 17.1), providing religious education in all schools (Article 16.1), and official recognition of major Catholic feast days (Article 9.1). It also establishes a Mixed Commission to address further issues (Article 18.2). However, the government failed to re-establish this joint commission following governmental changes. Similarly, the joint commission with the Serbian Orthodox Church was not re-established.[10]
Since 2010, the Islamic Community in BiH has been seeking to formalise its relationship with the State through a concordat. In 2015, the Council of Ministers approved a draft agreement and forwarded it to the Presidency for final approval. However, the agreement has faced delays and remains unimplemented. In February 2023, the Islamic Community accused political leaders of blocking the agreement, alleging discrimination against Bosnian Muslims.[11]
Established in 1997, the Interreligious Council continues to play a pivotal role in fostering mutual respect, cooperation, and religious freedom in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[12]
In July 2023, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina ruled that the prohibition of religious symbols in public service was a “necessary measure in a democratic society”. This decision upheld the ban on wearing the hijab within the Armed Forces of BiH, emphasising the principle of neutrality in public service.[13]
On 29 August 2023, The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled in the case of Kovacevic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina that BiH’s constitution and electoral laws violate human rights by discriminating based on ethnic and territorial requirements.[14]
Religious communities, including Muslims, Catholics, and Serbian Orthodox, reported ongoing discrimination, especially for refugees returning to their communities. The head of the Islamic Community, Husein Effendi Kavazovic, criticised the lack of action on these issues, including underrepresentation of non-Serbs in the police.[15]
Religious leaders also noted police reluctance to investigate hate crimes against minorities. The Interreligious Council expressed said that the authorities were discriminating against religious minorities by failing to address violence and harassment which targeted them.[16]
Incidents and developments
The close connection between religious identity and ethnicity in Bosnia and Herzegovina often blurs the line between ethnic and religious hostility. During the reporting period, incidents of hate crimes motivated by religion and ethnicity continued to be alarmingly common.
In 2023, the Interreligious Council of BiH (IRC) recorded four incidents of religious intolerance against officials and believers, along with eight cases of vandalism targeting religious sites. This compares to two and 15 incidents, respectively, in 2022. Targets included three Islamic, three Orthodox, and two Catholic properties. The IRC believes many cases go unreported due to fear, and its limited resources prevent full investigations, leaving it to register only reported or media-covered incidents.[17]
The 2023 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) hate crime report had higher numbers: the police recorded 24 anti-Christian, 22 anti-Muslim, one antisemitic, and one unspecified religion-based hate crime. Civil society reported 21 anti-Muslim incidents, including three violent attacks, six cases of threats or harassment, and 12 property attacks. There were 15 anti-Christian crimes, including one threat and 14 vandalism cases. Two antisemitic crimes were documented: one violent attack and one property attack.[18] In their hate crime report, The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) acknowledges BiH’s efforts in reporting hate crimes but notes flaws in distinguishing hate crimes from other crimes and low official figures, urging for better training for justice officials in identifying hate crimes.[19]
On the positive note, on 19 March 2024, Sarajevo hosted the launch of the Southeast Europe Network of the International Panel of Parliamentarians for Freedom of Religion or Belief (IPPFORB). The event gathered parliamentarians, religious leaders, and civil society representatives to discuss challenges and promote religious freedom in the region.[20]
On 23 May 2024, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution establishing an “International Day of Remembrance of the Srebrenica Genocide”, to be observed annually on 11 July, commemorating the 1995 genocide in Srebrenica, which saw the deaths of some 8,000 men and teenagers, following the failure of a UN peacekeeping force to protect a “safe zone”. The move sparked strong opposition from Bosnian Serb leaders and the Serbian government who have historically contested the characterisation of the massacre as genocide and said that the resolution would deepen divisions.[21]
Christianity
On 26 January 2023, Metropolitan Hrizostom announced the withdrawal of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) from the Interreligious Council of BiH (IRC), citing the IRC's insufficient condemnation of recent ethnic tensions. The SOC removed its staff from the IRC's Secretariat, Executive Board, and 18 local chapters.[22]
On 26 March 2023, an unidentified individual tried to forcefully enter the Orthodox Cathedral of the Ascension in Stolac, causing damage to the church door and surrounding bricks. Priest Dejan Grčić reported the incident to the police, who conducted an investigation. [23] Grčić expressed concern, stating that the incident sent a negative message to the Serbian community regarding the security of their property. Similarly, Nedeljko Đogo, a Serbian councillor in the Stolac Municipal Council, condemned the act.[24]
On 6 May 2023, the parish priest of Dobrinje village in Visoko Municipality, reported that unknown individuals had broken into and vandalised the Catholic Chapel of Saint Leopold Mandic. The perpetrators stole several liturgical items.[25]
On 27 September 2023, in the Church of Christ the Saviour in Banja Luka, President Stevandić of the Republika Srpska attended a memorial service for Serbs killed in in Banjska, Kosovo, earlier that month.[26] Serb militants had ambushed a police patrol which was checking unlicensed lorries, killing a sergeant. The militants then took refuge in an Orthodox monastery, where three of them were killed in an ensuing gun battle with the police.[27]
In January 2024, the OSCE Mission to BiH responded to hate crimes around the Serbian Orthodox Christmas and the unconstitutional Day of Republika Srpska on 9 January. Non-Serbs in Republika Srpska faced threats, armed convoys, and war criminal glorification, while Serb-owned property was damaged in the predominantly Bosniak and Croat Federation. The OSCE criticised authorities for rarely investigating or prosecuting such incidents, fostering an environment of impunity.[28]
In June 2024, Vojin Mijatović, Deputy Prime Minister of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), and Nerin Dizdar, FBiH Minister of Displaced Persons and Refugees, visited a Serbian Orthodox church in Sarajevo to sign financial aid agreements totalling nearly €170,000. The funds are intended to support the preservation of cultural and religious heritage through the reconstruction of church infrastructure.[29]
In August 2024, the Serbian Orthodox Metropolitan, Hrizostom Jević of Dabar-Bosnia, publicly criticised the establishment of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU). He described its creation as an act of revenge against the Russian Orthodox Church, reflecting the broader geopolitical and ecclesiastical tensions surrounding the recognition of the OCU’s autocephaly.[30]
On 19 September 2024, the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith invited Church authorities to “appreciate the pastoral value” of the phenomenon of pilgrimages to Medjugore and “even promote its spread”. At the same time, the dicastery left it to each diocesan bishop to “assess prudently” how to respond. While acknowledging the “beautiful and positive” fruits of the reported apparitions in Medjugore, it refrained from saying that they were authentic. Over 40 million people have visited Medjugorje since the visions were first reported by four children in June 1981.[31]
On 7 February 2025, the Catholic community commemorated the 80th anniversary of martyrdoms in Široki Brijeg, where, in 1945, 30 Franciscan friars were forcibly removed from their monastery and presented with a final ultimatum: renounce their faith or face execution. The friars refused to abandon their beliefs, and as a result, were executed and burned, with their remains discarded in mass graves. The commemoration honoured their steadfastness and sacrifice as a profound expression of faith under persecution.[32]
Islam
On 14 January 2023, a video surfaced on social media showing a young man urinating on the Dasnica Mosque in Bijeljina, Republika Srpska, while another filmed and hurled insults at Muslims. The Islamic community reported the incident, and police identified two 17-year-old perpetrators. The Bijeljina Prosecutor's Office was advised to consider hate crime charges, but no further legal updates have been disclosed.[33]
On 1 March 2023, Metropolitan Hrizostom referred to Bosniaks as “Muslims” and later as “Mohammedans”, an outdated and offensive term. Days later, on 4 March, the Islamic community leader Reis-ul-ulema stated that Bosniaks must be “ready to defend” Bosnia and Herzegovina’s institutions and, if they fell as in 1992, be prepared to protect the country “with weapons as well”.[34] These events have fuelled concerns over increasing polarisation and hindered reconciliation efforts in the nation.
On 23 March 2023, in Republika Srpska, two elderly Bosniak returnees were assaulted and robbed by unidentified individuals.[35]
Many foreign Muslim fighters who entered during the civil war in the 1990’s to fight alongside Bosnian Muslims have stayed in BiH. These tend to be Wahhabi Muslim, a conservative Islamic sect, and receive funding from Saudi charitable foundations.[36] This has led to disputes and some violent clashes between more moderate, local Muslims, and the Wahhabi holding more radical views of Islam.
BiH continues to address the challenges of returning citizens who fought for the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (Daesh or ISIS). On 17 November 2023, Adnan Catic was arrested at Sarajevo Airport after allegedly spending nearly a decade with Daesh. He was placed in custody on suspicion of organising a terrorist group.[37]
Between 25 and 30 Bosnian citizens, including fighters, and their families, await repatriation. Male fighters face prosecution, while the status of their families remains uncertain. BiH has prosecuted at least 50 returnees, but reintegration challenges persist, particularly for IS-affiliated women and children.[38]
In January 2024, the Prosecutor's Office of BiH filed an indictment against an individual for allegedly planning an attack on a mosque in Zenica in 2023. The accused was arrested in connection with an investigation into the preparation of a terrorist attack.[39]
In May 2024, the Ottoman-era Arnaudija Mosque in Banja Luka was officially reopened following its reconstruction. Originally destroyed during the 1992–1995 war, it was one of 16 mosques demolished in the city during the conflict. The reopening ceremony was attended by hundreds of Muslims, marking a significant moment for the local Muslim community and for efforts to restore part of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s religious and cultural heritage.[40]
On 19 January 2025, Luka Babić, Abbot of Karno Monastery in Srebrenica, was accused by Bosniak representatives in the Srebrenica Municipal Assembly, local associations, and residents of Kragljivode of placing Christian crosses among gravestones in a Muslim cemetery in the village. A criminal complaint was filed against him, with the act described as religiously and ethnically provocative, interpreted as an attempt to symbolically “convert” the dead. The incident sparked widespread condemnation from the local Muslim community.[41]
Judaism
There were also positive developments in the reporting period. On 27 January 2024, the Council of Europe’s Human Rights Commissioner praised the joint Muslim and Jewish observance of International Holocaust Remembrance Day in BiH, calling it a “beacon of hope”. The event highlighted the importance of interfaith solidarity, remembrance, and combating antisemitism and hate speech.[42]
Prospects for freedom of religion
Religious freedom in Bosnia and Herzegovina remains closely tied to ethnic and political divisions. While the legal framework guarantees religious rights, enforcement is inconsistent, with hate crimes, vandalism of religious sites, and discrimination often met with weak institutional responses. The failure to establish joint commissions between the government and religious communities exacerbates tensions, while in Republika Srpska, political actions further undermine religious and minority rights.
Despite these challenges, some positive steps have been taken. The joint Muslim-Jewish observance of Holocaust Remembrance Day and the launch of the Southeast Europe Network for Freedom of Religion or Belief highlight efforts to promote interfaith solidarity. Moving forward, strengthening the rule of law, addressing hate crimes, and fostering dialogue will be essential to help advance religious freedom and peaceful coexistence.
Prospects for religious freedom remain unchanged.
Sources