ETHIOPIA
Legal framework on freedom of religion and actual application
The Constitution of Ethiopia of 1994 enshrines, in Article 11 (1 and 2), the principle of separation between State and religion. Article 11 (2) adds that there shall be no State religion and Article 11 (3) that the State shall not interfere in religious matters, nor religion in state affairs. Article 27 (1) acknowledges the freedom of conscience and religion, including the freedom, “either individually or in community with others, in public or in private, to manifest one’s religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, and teaching.” Article 27 (2) establishes the right to set up institutions to propagate religious beliefs, while Article 27 (3) guarantees the freedom of individuals to hold a belief of their choice. Article 27 (4) guarantees the right of parents to educate their children in conformity with their convictions.[1]
The preamble to the constitution articulates the intention of “ensuring a lasting peace, guaranteeing a democratic order, and advancing our economic and social development” which will be based on “our rich and proud cultural legacies” and “continuous interaction on various levels”.[2]
The constitution prohibits religious teaching in all schools, both public and private. Article 90 (2) states: “Education shall be conducted in a manner which is free from any religious influence, political partisanship or cultural prejudices.” Religious education is permitted in churches and mosques.
The Revised Political Parties Registration Proclamation of 2008 (Article 11.5) prohibits religious organisations from registering as political parties.[3]
Under a law introduced in February 2009 called the Charities and Societies Proclamation, all Churches and religious groups are considered charity organisations and as such are required to be recognised as a juridical body, submitting a request for registration to the Ministry of Justice.[4] They must renew this application every three years. Without such registration, they cannot engage in activities such as opening a bank account or obtaining legal representation. The Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC) and the Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council (EIASC) are exempt from this three-year renewal process. Churches and other agencies specialising in charitable and development work are required to register with the Charities and Societies Agency, separately from the religious body to which they belong, and are thus subject to existing legislation on NGOs.
Charities which receive more than 10 percent of their funding from abroad are not allowed to campaign on human and disability rights or gender equality. They are, however, allowed to carry on charitable activities which are not focussed on advocacy, for example, establishing hospices, setting up agricultural projects or carrying out reforestation.[5]
Applications to register as a religious group fall under the Directorate of Faith and Religious Affairs of the Ministry of Peace. Registering grants religious organisations legal status, which gives their members the right to congregate, obtain land to build places of worship, and build cemeteries.[6] Religious groups must file annual reports and issue financial statements.
Ethiopia is ethnically very diverse and defines itself as a country of distinct “nations, nationalities and peoples” (1994 constitution, Article 8,1). There are more than 80 spoken languages. Speakers of Amharic, Oromo, Tigrinya, and Somali constitute about two-thirds of the population.[7] Article 5 of the 1994 constitution grants equal status to all Ethiopian languages and entitles each of the country’s eleven[8] regional states (Article 47,1) to choose its working language; however, Amharic is the only working language of Ethiopia’s federal government. This proved to be a bone of contention among the country’s largest ethnic groups with implications for religion as well. In 2020, the central government added Afan Oromo, Afar, Somali, and Tigrinya as official languages.[9]
In addition to language, Ethiopia is characterised by great religious diversity in a deeply religious society. About 63 percent of the population of more than 130 million is Christian and 34 percent is Muslim. Orthodox Christians make up about 44 percent, particularly in the Tigray and Amhara states and some parts of Oromia, while Sunni Muslims make up just over half the population in Oromia and are dominant in the Somali and Afar regions. Evangelical and Pentecostal Christians are around 19 per cent and are most strongly concentrated in the south-west. Catholics represent about 0.7 per cent of the population.[10]
Ethnic Amhara, Tigrayans and speakers of other Semitic languages who are largely Orthodox Christians, live in the northern highlands. Historically, they have dominated the country’s political life. Most Muslims, Protestants and followers of indigenous beliefs tend to live in lowland areas in the country’s South and East.[11]
A 2008 law made it a criminal offence to incite hostility between religions by means of the media,[12] as well as to engage in blasphemy and the defamation of religious leaders.[13] Various government and civil society initiatives have sought to promote harmonious coexistence between religions and to prevent and solve conflicts related to religion. The government has created the National Interfaith Peace Council,[14] which works with state governments to foster religious coexistence.
The government does not grant permanent visas to foreign religious workers unless they are involved in development projects managed by registered NGOs affiliated with their respective Churches. This policy is not normally applied in the case of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church. Since the Catholic Church is considered a charity, foreign religious staff are not allowed to retire in Ethiopia but can continue to work beyond the age of 65.
In April 2021, Ethiopia enacted significant media reforms with the adoption of Media Proclamation No. 1238/2021, which entered into force on 5 April 2021. For the first time in the country’s history, the legislation allowed religious organisations to apply for broadcasting licenses. Although these licenses were limited to internet and satellite platforms, the reform represented a notable shift in Ethiopia’s media landscape by formally acknowledging the role of religious institutions in the public communication sphere and enabling them to reach broader audiences through authorised channels.[15]
Some Christian and Muslim holy days are statutory holidays. Official holidays include Orthodox Christmas, Epiphany, Good Friday, Easter, Meskel (the Discovery of the True Cross), Eid al-Adha, Mawlid (birth of the Prophet Muhammad), and Eid al-Fitr.[16] Muslim public servants can take a two-hour break for Friday prayer, but this does not apply to employees in the private sector.[17]
Shari‘a courts have jurisdiction in personal status cases when both parties are Muslim and agree to submit to it.[18]
Addis Ababa hosts the African Union, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the Pan African Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the African Standby Force.
Incidents and developments
Abiy Ahmed, an ethnic Oromo and Pentecostal Christian, has served as Ethiopia’s Prime Minister since April 2018 and was awarded the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize for his role in resolving the border conflict with Eritrea.[19] In the initial years of his leadership, the government released thousands of political prisoners, welcomed exiled opposition figures and religious scholars, and reopened previously banned media outlets. Religious tolerance and the threat of radicalisation became central topics of public discourse, with Abiy promoting interfaith dialogue and cooperation between Christian and Muslim leaders. [20] These efforts initially fostered a more open civic environment. However, the situation has become increasingly complex in recent years, amid renewed internal conflicts and state-imposed restrictions — particularly in the Amhara and Tigray regions — posing fresh challenges to civil liberties and interreligious coexistence.
Since early 2023, tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea have resurged, primarily due to shifting dynamics in the aftermath of the Tigray war. While the Pretoria Agreement of November 2022 brought a halt to most hostilities between Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the continued presence of Eritrean troops in Tigray has fuelled mistrust in Addis Ababa. In early 2025, Eritrea carried out a full military mobilisation and Ethiopian deployed forces to the border, heightening fears of renewed conflict. This escalation is linked to Eritrea’s exclusion from the peace process, Ethiopia’s aspirations for Red Sea access, and internal divisions within the TPLF.
The conflict in northern Ethiopia first erupted after Abiy Ahmed indefinitely postponed parliamentary elections set for August 2020, which the Tigrayans saw as an assault on democracy. After they went ahead with elections in their own region the central government suspended funding and cut ties, which Tigray’s administration said amounted to a “declaration of war”.
In November 2020, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) was accused of attacking a base of the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) in the Tigrayan capital of Melelle to steal weapons, an incident which triggered a full-scale war. In response, the ENDF — backed by the Eritrean army and allied ethnic militias — engaged in combat against the TPLF, the Tigray Defence Forces, and other rebel groups such as the Oromo Liberation Army.[21]
The TPLF, once the dominant force within the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition, had retreated to its regional stronghold in Tigray after losing national power in 2018. Mounting tensions over political marginalisation and territorial disputes ultimately escalated into open warfare.
The conflict brought immense devastation, including widespread atrocities against civilians and religious communities. Hundreds of members of the Christian clergy were killed, numerous places of worship were destroyed, and mass killings occurred during religious festivals — most notably the massacre of 160 worshippers at Maryam Dengelat by the Eritrean army. After denouncing the violence, the Patriarch of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church was reportedly placed under house arrest. In another act of religious repression, 17 members of a Salesian educational centre in Addis Ababa — including priests and staff — were arbitrarily detained in November 2021 and taken to an undisclosed location.[22]
Despite continued violence, peace efforts gradually progressed. A temporary truce declared in March 2022 failed to hold. The government then made a series of military gains through the use of drones supplied by Turkey resulting in mass civilian casualties which included children.[23] The Tigrayans accepted a humanitarian truce,[24] and on 2 November 2022, the Ethiopian government and the TPLF signed a ceasefire agreement in South Africa, brokered by the African Union.[25] While tentative, the agreement marked a significant step toward ending the conflict.
Following the ceasefire, the country’s Catholic bishops issued a message at the end of their annual ordinary assembly, encouraging the parties to work “diligently” for a lasting peace.[26]
Despite this, since 2023 Ethiopia has experienced a marked escalation in violent unrest, primarily due to insurgent activity in the Oromia and Amhara regions. In Oromia, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) has been responsible for widespread kidnappings and extortion, heightening insecurity among civilians and foreign workers.[27] Although a partial peace agreement was reached in December 2024 with a faction of the OLA, sporadic violence has continued.[28]
In the Amhara region,[29] a full-scale rebellion broke out in mid-2023 in response to government efforts to disarm local militias which had supported the government in the fight against the TPLF. The Fano militia led a sustained insurgency, provoking drone strikes, arbitrary arrests, and severe civilian casualties. In reaction, the federal government imposed a state of emergency from August 2023 to June 2024.[30]
Al-Shabaab terrorist group has continued to pose a serious threat along the Somalia–Ethiopia border, particularly in the Bale region, where an estimated one thousand fighters remain active. Although no large-scale attacks have been recorded in recent months, the group has persistently tested Ethiopian defences and carried out targeted acts of violence.[31] In response, Ethiopia has reinforced domestic security measures and sustained its military involvement in Somalia.[32] However, regional counterterrorism cooperation faces increasing strain due to growing tensions with the Somali government — tensions further aggravated by Ethiopia’s agreement with Somaliland which gives it access to the Gulf of Aden.[33] In this context, Al-Shabaab continues to represent a tangible threat to Ethiopia’s internal stability and to the broader security architecture of the Horn of Africa.
Christians in regions such as Somali State and parts of Oromia have faced attacks by Islamic mobs and have frequently been denied access to shared community resources, resulting in social exclusion and increased vulnerability. In particular, non-traditional Protestant converts residing in areas with strong Muslim or Ethiopian Orthodox presence have experienced growing pressure, social isolation, and, in some cases, physical violence.[34]
In January 2023, the Holy Synod of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC) excommunicated three archbishops and 25 bishops. The archbishops had tried to establish a rival synod to establish a separate patriarchate for the Oromo region. Those concerned about the schism in the Church saw it as being driven by the politics of identity where Church leaders wished to establish a patriarchate that reflected the current ethnic-based political and administrative arrangements.[35] The three archbishops who initiated the rift said the EOTC did not appoint bishops from the Oromo region, rather they “appoint spiritual fathers from one region (Amhara)”.
In February 2023, the 25 bishops agreed to renounce their titles and return to their former positions,[36] while the Addis Ababa-based synod agreed to make an effort to provide services and lessons in local languages to meet the demands of people. Seminaries will also train local ministers to understand the native languages of people in the country. Although there is a resolution between the estranged former bishops and the leaders, there is a fear that this incident will cause tension and heighten religious and ethnic rivalries.
On 31 May 2023, Ethiopian security forces violently dispersed mass protests near the Grand Anwar Mosque in Addis Ababa. The demonstrations were sparked by the demolition of at least 19 mosques in the rapidly expanding urban area of Sheger City, reportedly linked to government redevelopment initiatives. According to the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC), approximately 140 individuals were arrested for allegedly participating in violent protests.[37]
Islamic institutions across the country strongly condemned the excessive use of force and the judicial response, accusing the authorities of targeting Muslims who were peacefully defending their rights. Just days earlier, on 26 May, security forces had opened fire on Muslims staging a peaceful protest following Friday prayers, resulting in at least two deaths, multiple injuries, and dozens of arrests.[38]
In September 2023, the celebration of Demera, which commemorates St Helena finding the Cross of Christ in the 4th century in Jerusalem, was tightly controlled by the government. Festival attendees were prohibited from wearing national colours and were instructed to dress in white. The only flag used during the celebration was the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewhedo Church flag.[39]
In February 2024, 80 followers of a cult called Christ Disciples Church travelled from eastern Uganda to Ethiopia, having been told that by their pastor, Simon Opolot, that they would “meet Jesus Christ” and that the world would end after they had fasted there for 40 days. Ethiopian authorities found the group, mainly made up of teachers and civil servants, in a fragile state, and repatriated them to Uganda.[40]
A February 2024 study titled “Media and Religion in Ethiopia” found that recent constitutional reforms and media regulations have significantly reshaped the relationship between religion, media, and the State. Although the 2021 Media Proclamation allowed religious organisations to apply for broadcasting licenses, the government has adopted a cautious approach. Between 2021 and 2023, approximately 50 religious groups were granted licenses; however, these permits are limited to internet and satellite broadcasting, excluding access to local radio or terrestrial television. At the same time, religious expression has become more visible in mainstream media. Public broadcasters increasingly feature presenters wearing visible religious symbols — such as Orthodox crosses or Muslim hijabs — reflecting a growing acceptance of religious identity in the public sphere. The open Evangelical faith of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has also contributed to this shift, reinforcing the prominence of religion in national discourse.[41]
In August 2024, the synod of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church apologised for failing to call for peace during the war with Tigray, but critics of the synod said that the apology did not go far enough. In 2021, the bishops of Tigray had cut their links with the synod as a protest over its failure to condemn the war and were excommunicated. One of the breakaway bishops, Petros Haileselassie, said that the leaders of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church had become “supporters and leaders of the genocidal war.”[42]
In December 2024, Muslim students in the Central Zone of the Tigray region protested against a hijab ban that they claim barred them from attending school and violated their rights. The Islamic Council met with the Addis Ababa Peace and Security Bureau, the police, and the education department and secured the reinstatement of the students.[43]
In September 2024 in Addis Ababa, the Director General at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Semunegus Hailegiorgis, reaffirmed Ethiopia’s dedication to the Geneva Conventions, whose 75th anniversary was being marked.[44] Under Article 9.4 of the constitution, all international agreements ratified by Ethiopia are an integral part of the country’s law.[45] Article 24 of the First Geneva Convention states that “medical staff…shall be respected and protected in all circumstances”.[46]
In December 2024, Ethiopia’s Catholic bishops issued a strong appeal for peace ahead of Christmas. In the final message of their ordinary assembly, they urged the faithful and national leaders to draw inspiration from the “King of Peace” and promote peaceful coexistence amid ongoing ethnic tensions and humanitarian crises. Emphasising Advent as a time of hope and divine promise, they called on all to become peacemakers. The bishops also condemned the impact of conflict on the Church’s mission, noting that parishes had become inaccessible, institutions damaged, and personnel forced to work under insecure conditions.[47]
In 2025, conflict in the North of the country reignited the emigration of Jews to Israel, with a first group of 26 leaving in February and dozens more preparing to go. They will join some 160,000 Beta Israel Jews who have left Ethiopia since the 1980s for the Holy Land. Meanwhile the emigration to Israel of the Falash Mura community — Ethiopian Jews who have adopted Chrisitan faith — has been put on hold, partly due to insecurity following the October 2023 Hamas attack and partly due to objections from Jews in Israel.[48]
Prospects for freedom of religion
Although the 2022 peace agreement between the federal government and the TPLF represented a crucial turning point, Ethiopia’s peace remains fragile. The underlying drivers of conflict — ethnic rivalries, power imbalances, and deep-rooted grievances — persist. The insurgency in Amhara, ongoing violence in Oromia, and rising tensions with Eritrea contribute to a climate of uncertainty. Religious actors have continued to suffer the consequences of this instability: Christian clergy have been killed, places of worship destroyed, and religious communities targeted amid broader political and ethnic violence. The Church’s pastoral mission has also been severely disrupted, with parishes rendered inaccessible and clergy forced to operate under precarious conditions.
Interreligious coexistence has come under increasing pressure, particularly in regions such as Somali State and parts of Oromia. Tensions have also emerged within religious communities themselves. In early 2023, a schism within the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church underscored the close link between religious leadership and ethnic identity. In December 2024, the Tigray Muslim student protests against the enforcement of a hijab ban, highlighted the continuing frictions between religious practice and administrative policy. These developments reflect the broader vulnerability of religious minorities, converts, and other marginalised groups living in areas dominated by larger religious or ethnic blocs.
The persistence of instability, the politicisation of religious identity, and recurring episodes of religiously motivated violence suggest that the overall conditions for freedom of religion remain largely unchanged.
Sources
Ethiopia