MOZAMBIQUE
Legal framework on freedom of religion and actual application
Mozambique is a secular State that enshrines the separation of State and religious denominations (Article 12.1–2 of the 2004 constitution),[1] a principle that cannot be amended (Article 292.c). The constitution recognises the organisational freedom of worship in conformity with state legislation (Article 12.3), as well as their “right to pursue their religious aims freely and to own and acquire assets for realising their objectives” (Article 54.3). The State “shall recognise and esteem the activities of religious denominations to promote a climate of understanding, tolerance and peace, the strengthening of national unity, the material and spiritual well-being of citizens, and economic and social development” (Article 12.4).
The constitution guarantees all citizens’ equality before the law and equal rights without discrimination on religious grounds (Article 35). It bans any discrimination, persecution, prejudice, deprivation of rights, or the conferral of benefits or exemptions from duties on the grounds of faith or religious practice (Article 54.2). All citizens are free “to practice or not to practice a religion” (Article 54.1). Freedom of religion is non-derogable even in a stage of siege or national emergency (Article 286). The right to conscientious objection is guaranteed under Article 54.5. Access to public office may not be obstructed on grounds of religion (Article 251.1). The use of computers to record and process personally identifiable data about philosophical or ideological beliefs or religious faith is prohibited (Article 71.1). Political parties cannot use names “containing expressions that are directly related to any religious denominations or churches”, or “emblems that may be confused with national or religious symbols” (Article 76). Professional associations and trades unions must be independent of churches and religious denominations (Article 86.3). Article 39 provides for the punishment by law of “all acts intended to undermine national unity, to disturb social harmony or to create divisions or situations of privilege or discrimination” based, among other things, on religion. The protection of places of worship is guaranteed by the State (Article 54.4). State education cannot follow particular religious or ideological guidelines (Article 113.5). The civil effects of religious marriage and the requirements for its registration are established by law (Article 119.4). NGOs, including religious ones, must register with the Ministry of Justice.[2]
Mozambique is predominantly Christian, with 5.7 million Catholics and 2.5 million Protestants, and has a large Muslim community of 3.6 million, mostly Sunni. Muslims form the majority in the northern provinces of Niassa (61 percent) and Cabo Delgado (54 percent), as well as in coastal areas.[3] Southern Mozambique and the main cities are predominantly Christian. The Brazilian Neo-Pentecostal Universal Church of the Kingdom of God has expanded rapidly in the country,[4] and 3.1 million Mozambicans belong to Zionist Churches. Traditional African religions are also strongly represented, particularly in rural regions. In Cabo Delgado province — where most jihadist attacks have occurred — Catholics make up about 36 percent of the population, alongside smaller Protestants and Zionist communities.[5]
Relations between the Republic of Mozambique and the Holy See, based on the principles of cooperation, independence and autonomy, are governed by a 2011 agreement.[6] This recognises the Catholic Church in Mozambique as having “legal personality and the right to carry out its apostolic mission, guaranteeing the public exercise of its activities, carried out directly or through its institutions, in conformity with the Mozambican legal system and its ethical principles” (Article 5.1). It affirms the Church’s “right to exercise pastoral, spiritual, formative and educational activities in all its training, educational, health and social service institutions” (Article 12). Catholic marriages have civil effects when registered (Article 14.3). The secrecy of the confessional, including the right to refuse to testify before State organs, is inviolable, as are Church archives (Article 10). Catholic education is recognised, including the right to religious teaching in Catholic institutions (Article 15).
Religious leaders have played an active role in peacebuilding. On 3 January 2022, Christian and Muslim leaders jointly issued the Interfaith Declaration of Pemba, committing to promote the authentic values of religion and to prevent faith — particularly Islam, which has been disproportionately affected by prejudice — from being associated with violence or social division.[7]
In May 2022, Mozambique’s parliament approved amendments to the anti-terrorism law, which President Filipe Nyusi enacted the following month. The revised legislation imposes severe penalties — including up to eight years’ imprisonment — for individuals who publicly reproduce false statements about terrorist acts.[8] Civil society organisations, including the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA–Mozambique) and the Committee to Protect Journalists, raised concerns that the vague definition of “false statements” could be used to suppress reporting on the Islamist insurgency in Cabo Delgado, posing a serious threat to press freedom.[9]
In October 2024, Mozambique held general elections. In December, the top electoral court upheld the results, reaffirming the Frelimo party’s hold on power. Daniel Chapo was named the next president, while the challenger Venancio Mondlane received 24 percent of the vote.[10] Nationwide demonstrations erupted following the killing of two prominent opposition figures, with reports of widespread violence leaving more than 300 people dead. The deaths were attributed to security forces.[11]
Incidents and Developments
While discrepancies remain about the group’s origin, the Islamic State’s Mozambique branch (ISM), locally known as Al-Shabaab (unrelated to the Somali organisation) , started as a religious organization called Al-Sunna wa Jama‘a (ASWJ) in 2007, with the intent that Mozambique should have a Muslim government and implement Sharia Law.[12] A sub-organization within the Islamic Council of Mozambique, ASWJ recruited “through family connections and radical mosques where anti-state ideology and a stricter interpretation of Islam were preached”.[13] In 2019, ASWJ formally aligned with the Islamic State (IS) and began operating under the banner of IS – Central Africa Province (ISCAP). In 2022, aligning more closely with IS branding to attract resources, legitimacy, and recruits, ISCAP was officially recognized as a distinct Islamic State province, IS-Mozambique (ISM).[14]
As a Salafist terrorist group, ASWJ emerged in October 2017 launching attacks repeated attacks against civilians both Christian, and Muslims who refuted the extremist ideology, in the northeastern Cabo Delgado province. Between 2017 and 2018, the group conducted 66 attacks and in 2019, it escalated its assaults on urban centres and strategic infrastructure, including a major liquid natural gas project.
In 2020, ISCAP briefly captured the port town of Mocímboa da Praia, disrupting key transport routes. However, international military interventions since 2021 have significantly weakened the group, prompting a shift in focus from civilian populations to state targets and energy infrastructure and expanding its operations beyond Cabo Delgado into neighbouring provinces and across the Tanzanian border.[15]
In October 2023, a study co-funded by European Union and produced by the Catholic organisation International Co-operation for Development and Solidarity (CIDSE) observed that although the conflict “has consistently been blamed on Islamic Jihad groups backed by ISIS … analysts and victims point to the control of land and mineral resources as the real roots of the conflicts.” CIDSE reported that local populations were “being forced off their land by transnational corporations to make way for their and other prospectors’ projects.”[16]
By late 2023 and into the first half of 2024, ISM intensified operations, expanding into new areas such as Chiure and Mecúfi districts in southern Cabo Delgado. The group carried out massacres, kidnappings and other attacks, displacing more than 200,000 people. Despite international interventions, ISM exploited governance gaps to rebuild and consolidate territorial control, employing strategies reminiscent of Islamic State campaigns in Iraq, Syria and Libya.[17]
In response to the escalating insurgency in Cabo Delgado, the Mozambican government pursued a multi-pronged approach. Beginning in 2017, authorities closed mosques suspected of fostering extremism. In mid-2021, the government formally requested regional assistance, prompting the deployment of the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) together with more than 1,000 Rwandan troops.[18] These combined forces succeeded in retaking key strategic locations, including Mocímboa da Praia and Mbau.[19]
Bishop António Juliasse of Pemba described Cabo Delgado as a region marked by seven years of displacement, violence and humanitarian crisis. Insecurity has prevented thousands from cultivating their land, exacerbating hunger, disease and the destruction of healthcare infrastructure. Education has also been severely disrupted. Since 2017, the Islamist insurgency, has caused over 6,000 deaths and displaced nearly one million people. According to the bishop, peace remains elusive in Cabo Delgado.[20]
In 2023, for the first time, violent incidents linked to ISM decreased by 27 percent, and fatalities by 43 percent.[21] While the group still maintained support from transnational jihadist networks, the number of active militants fell from 2,500 in 2020 to 300 in 2023.[22] The figures can be attributed to the military effectiveness of the joint Mozambique’s Defence and Security Forces with regional allies, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Rwanda Defence Force, reclaiming territory and disrupting ISM’s supply lines and safe havens. Additionally, in August 2023, FDS announced the killing of Bonomade Machude Omar, ISM’s top commander, along with two deputies creating a leadership vacuum and fragmenting command structures.[23]
In October 2023, TotalEnergies and ExxonMobil ended the practice of paying subsidies directly into the accounts of around 800 Mozambican and Rwandan soldiers in a Joint Task Force protecting their installations. The companies had been advised that, to avoid implication in potential human rights abuses, they should instead make payments directly to the government of Mozambique.[24] A previous July 2020 newsletter from the Islamic State highlighted the role of “crusader oil companies” and abuses by the security forces against civilians as factors justifying the conflict.[25]
Despite the overall decline in violence, sporadic targeted attacks and violence continue in the country suggesting a strategic shift—from holding territory to demonstrating reach and unpredictability for maximum propaganda impact.[26]
On 15 September 2023, at least 11 Christians were killed by Islamic State-affiliated militants in Naquitengue village, near Mocímboa da Praia in Cabo Delgado province. According to missionary Friar Boaventura, the assailants arrived in the afternoon, assembled the residents, and separated Christians from Muslims based on names and ethnic profiles before executing the Christians. ISM claimed responsibility for 11 deaths, although the actual number may have been higher, with additional reports of serious injuries.[27]
Between December 2023 and March 2024, ISM carried out 57 attacks in Mozambique, a monthly rate roughly double that of the rest of 2023. In Cabo Delgado province, the group also occupied the town of Mucojo.[28]
In January 2024, ISM claimed responsibility for eight anti-Christian attacks across three districts of Cabo Delgado, resulting in 10 civilian fatalities and the destruction of more than 200 homes and churches.[29] These incidents appeared directly linked to a 4 January statement by Islamic State spokesperson Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari, who called for a global offensive under the slogan “Kill them wherever you find them” (Surah 2:191, Qur‘an), purportedly in retaliation for Muslim casualties in Gaza. The campaign explicitly urged attacks against Christians, Jews and so-called apostates worldwide. These developments suggested a closer operational alignment between the Mozambican insurgents and Islamic State central leadership than previously understood.[30]
On 7–8 February 2024, ISM claimed responsibility for an attack on an army post in the city of Macomia, Cabo Delgado province, in which 20 people were killed.[31]
On 9 February 2024, insurgents entered a village in Mazeze administrative post and burned down a church. The Islamic State claimed responsibility, stating that they had destroyed “four churches and a Christian school” in the village near the border of Nampula province. A Catholic priest who witnessed the violence said that there was “an hour of shooting because there was no police or military”.[32]
On 12 February 2024, the pro-Islamic State Telegram channel Bariqah released a photo and video claiming responsibility for an attack on a passenger bus in Cabo Delgado province, in which the driver was killed. The perpetrators reportedly left handwritten notes in English and Portuguese, signed by the so-called “government of the Islamic State of Mozambique”. The messages declared war on Christians worldwide, presenting three options: conversion to Islam, payment of the jizya (a tax imposed on non-Muslims under Islamic law), or death.[33]
On 15 February 2024, Islamic insurgents attacked Chiure district in southern part Cabo Delgado province.[34] ISM claimed responsibility for the February attacks via its al-Naba newspaper and affiliated social media, reporting the destruction of 18 churches across nine villages. The group also shared images of fighters setting fire to churches and desecrating Christian symbols, including crucifixes. While ISM has long framed its campaign as a holy war against “infidels”, this systematic targeting of churches marked a significant escalation reflecting broader efforts to project authority and mimic the structures of the Islamic State.[35]
In October 2024, following the election, amid reports of vote-rigging, gunmen ambushed a car and killed senior opposition official Paulo Guambe and Elvino Dias, legal adviser to the opposition leader Venancio Mondlane. Since then, dozens of killings and abductions were reported. In November 2024, the Criminal Investigation Service announced an investigation into the unlawful killings.[36] In April 2025, Attorney General Américo Letela, gave an evasive answer in Parliament about the deaths of Guambe and Dias, and asked for “patience”.[37]
Following the presidential and parliamentary elections of 9 October 2024, the Mozambican Catholic Bishops’ Conference issued a statement condemning the murders and denouncing serious electoral irregularities, including ballot stuffing, falsified voting sheets and manipulated results, as well as the targeted killings of opposition figures Elvino Dias and Paulo Guambe. The bishops described the post-election period as marked by a systematic assault on democracy and upheld the right to demonstrate. They also highlighted unprecedented voter abstention as evidence of deep public disillusionment with the integrity of the electoral process. In response, the bishops called for the respect for the right to protest, urged young demonstrators not to be instrumentalised in acts of violence, and appealed for truth and forgiveness.[38]
Post-election violence following Mozambique’s disputed October 2024 elections amplified public grievances, increased the risk of renewed conflict and reinforced insurgency narratives, as Islamic State-affiliated groups sought to expand their territorial influence.[39]
In November 2024, four Christians were captured and killed by ISM in Muidumbe District, Cabo Delgado. Earlier that month, another Christian was killed with a machine gun in the same region.[40] The Rwandan force deployed in Cabo Delgado, which has grown to 4,000 troops, appeared unable to provide effective protection to the civilian population.[41]
According to NGO research,[42] during the period under review, jihadist groups affiliated with the Islamic State intensified the abduction, rape, forced marriage and sexual enslavement of girls and young women in Cabo Delgado. Reports indicate that among the victims were Christian girls and women, who risked being subjected to forced marriage if they had converted from Islam.[43]
In November 2024, the Islamic Council of Mozambique expressed willingness to mediate between the government and the jihadist groups.[44]
Prospects for freedom of religion
The outlook for religious freedom in Mozambique remains deeply negative. The period under review, particularly 2024, was marked by a sharp escalation in anti-Christian violence, including systematic attacks on churches, religious symbols and faith communities, most notably in Cabo Delgado province.
Broader political instability further undermined protections for religious groups. The 2024 general elections were overshadowed by allegations of fraud, political violence and the targeted killing of opposition figures, as denounced by the Catholic Bishops’ Conference. The repression of peaceful protests and widespread public distrust in State institutions have further eroded the rule of law and deepened social divisions.
Against the backdrop of expanding jihadist influence, political turmoil and weak State authority in much of the north, the environment for human rights and religious freedom remains profoundly compromised.
Sources
Mozambique