NIGER
Legal framework on freedom of religion and actual application
Niger, a landlocked country in West Africa, has experienced political instability for most of its history since becoming independent in 1960.
A military coup occurred in Niger on 26–27 July 2023, during which the Presidential Guard deposed the elected President, Mohamed Bazoum. The 2010 constitution[1] was suspended and State institutions were dissolved. General Abdourahamane Tchiani, commander of the Guard, assumed power as head of the regime through the newly established National Council for the Safeguarding of the Homeland (Conseil National pour la Sauvegarde de la Patrie – CNSP).[2] The coup was triggered by Bazoum’s attempt to reshuffle military leadership. The army backed the junta to prevent violent clashes, and despite ongoing mediation efforts, the junta remains firmly in control.[3]
On 26 March 2025, a new Transitional Charter[4] was adopted, suspending the 2010 constitution and initiating a 60-month transition period, renewable depending on the security context.[5] The Charter emphasises the fight against terrorism (Article 2). Article 3 reaffirms Niger’s identity as a unitary, sovereign, democratic, and social Republic, and recognises Islam as the majority religion while affirming peaceful coexistence with other faiths and guaranteeing the practice of worship, provided it respects public order, morality, tolerance, and national unity. Article 34 guarantees freedom of thought, opinion, expression, conscience, religion, and worship. Article 51 penalises all acts of racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination, among others.
Compared to the 2010 Constitution, the Transitional Charter contains fewer provisions and omits certain elements previously enshrined — such as the requirement for the President, Prime Minister, and Speaker of the National Assembly and members of the Constitutional Court to take a religious oath upon assuming office. Nonetheless, Article 76 of the Charter states that all legislative provisions not explicitly repealed and not in contradiction with the Charter remain in force. Notably, while Article 3 of the 2010 Constitution affirmed, among other things, the separation of religion and State, the same article in the new Charter defines Islam as the State religion.
Muslims make up the majority of the country’s population, but there are small ethno-religionist and Christian communities. Most state schools do not include religious education, but the government funds a small number of primary schools which include Islamic religious studies.[6] Religious instruction is not allowed in state-run schools. Schools with religious sponsors must be approved by the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Education.[7]
The Religious Affairs Office in Niger’s Ministry of the Interior is responsible for interfaith dialogue.[8] Religious groups are treated in the same way as NGOs and must register with the Religious Affairs Office of the Ministry of the Interior.[9]
Under the civilian government, religious freedom was legally guaranteed, though certain restrictions on expression and worship were applied in practice. In June 2019, the National Assembly passed legislation reaffirming this freedom, conditional on respect for “public order and moral good”.[10] The law granted the State oversight in the construction and use of places of worship[11] and the regulation of foreign funding, particularly to curb the influence of Wahhabism.[12] That same year, a National Worship Strategy was introduced to manage religious affairs, prevent radicalisation, promote interfaith dialogue, and foster peaceful coexistence.[13] Following the July 2023 coup, the transitional government (CNSP) has maintained these frameworks. It has continued consultations with religious leaders and, so far, has not introduced any new restrictions on religious freedom.
In recent years, Niger has seen the growing influence of conservative Salafist networks, particularly Izala — a Salafist-oriented movement founded in northern Nigeria and active across West Africa. Before the July 2023 coup, several clerics affiliated with Izala served as government advisers, reflecting a broader shift in the country’s religious and political dynamics.[14]
Although no formal links between General Tchiani and the Izala movement have been documented, there has been engagement at the leadership level following the coup. In August 2023, Sheikh Abdullahi Bala Lau, a prominent Nigerian scholar and Izala leader, led a Nigerian delegation to Niger and met with General Tchiani and the junta-appointed Prime Minister, Ali Lamine Zeine. The visit formed part of broader international efforts to engage the new military leadership in dialogue, and to ease a tense stand-off between Niger and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) following the coup. According to Sheikh Lau, General Tchiani emphasised the historic ties between Niger and Nigeria, saying that the countries “were not only neighbours but brothers and sisters who should resolve issues amicably”.[15]
Ordinance 2024‑05, enacted on 23 February 2024 by Niger’s military junta, exempts all defence and security-related expenditures — including those for the presidential palace — from public oversight, audits, taxation, and standard financial procedures. Officially presented as a measure to enhance flexibility in counterterrorism efforts, it has been widely criticised for fostering opacity and enabling unchecked financial flows. The ordinance effectively grants the armed forces autonomous control over significant resources, bypassing accountability mechanisms. International observers view it as a sign of increasing authoritarianism and a potential enabler of corruption.[16]
Incidents and developments
The 2023 coup was the most significant in a series of military takeovers in Africa’s Sahel, a region plagued by extremist violence. Once the West’s key ally against jihadists, Niger has since seen worsening insecurity. Rebel and militia-related killings more than doubled, from 770 in the year before the coup to 1,599 in the year after.[17] Junta leader General Abdourahmane Tchiani claims to prioritise sovereignty, resource control, and governance, but according to Amnesty International the regime has tightened its grip on opposition, civil society, and independent media.[18]
In March 2024, the military-led governments of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso announced plans to establish a joint force to counter jihadist threats, further consolidating their alliance. The three regimes had already formalised their cooperation in September 2023 by creating the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), a mutual defence pact, and withdrawing from the G5 Sahel — an international framework which was originally established to combat Islamist insurgencies and which also included Mauritania and Chad. Despite these moves and the stated commitment of addressing the decade-long jihadist conflict, violence in the Sahel has continued to escalate.[19]
Niger has emerged as a major hotspot of Islamic extremism in Africa. Armed groups — including the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), al-Qaeda affiliates, and Boko Haram — remain active across the country, each pursuing distinct regional objectives. Between 2023 and 2024, ISSP escalated its operations in western Niger, using increasingly sophisticated tactics and cross-border raids launched from Mali and Burkina Faso. The violence was concentrated in the regions of Tillabéri, Dosso and Tahoua, with fighters reportedly advancing to within 100 kilometres of the capital, Niamey.[20]
The impact has been severe: rural governance has collapsed, hundreds of thousands have been displaced, humanitarian access is restricted, and religious minorities — especially Christians — are increasingly vulnerable. According to Open Doors, the jihadist group al-Sunnah wa Jama‘ah (ASWJ) has increasingly targeted Christians in Niger, making worship and daily life hazardous. In areas under ASWJ control, Christian gatherings face severe restrictions, with communities exposed to violence and abductions that seriously compromise their safety and religious freedom.[21]
According to the 2024 Global Terrorism Index, Niger recorded the world’s largest increase in terrorism-related deaths, which rose by 94 percent to 930. Attacks increased from 62 to 101, with civilian casualties tripling and military deaths reaching 499.[22] The Tillabéri region continued to record the highest levels of terrorist activity in Niger. Situated in the volatile area bordering Burkina Faso and Mali, it remains the hotspot of the Islamist insurgency in the Central Sahel. While terrorist incidents were reported in all eight of Niger’s regions, Tillabéri alone accounted for 63 percent of attacks and 67 percent of related deaths. Violence has also spread to neighbouring areas such as Tahoua, where fatalities have risen more than fivefold since 2023.[23]
This security deterioration coincides with major geopolitical shifts. Alongside Mali and Burkina Faso, Niger has distanced itself from Western allies, withdrawn from ECOWAS, and deepened ties with Russia and China.[24] These alignments have created security vacuums, enabling jihadist groups such as Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) to expand toward coastal West Africa. Meanwhile, competition over critical minerals — particularly uranium and gold — has intensified. As the world’s seventh-largest uranium producer, Niger has drawn increasing interest from global powers, with Russia and China offering support with fewer conditions than Western partners, reshaping the regional balance of power.[25]
In August 2023, a jihadist group stormed two churches in a village near the border with Burkina Faso, armed with rifles, knives and whips. They asked those inside if they were aware that Christian acts of worship were “prohibited” in the area. When the Christians said that they were unaware of this, the jihadists whipped them and told them that they would have to become Muslims if they wanted to continue worshipping.[26]
Also in August 2023, following the coup, thousands of Muslims flooded to the Grand Mosque of Niamey, where Allah has traditionally been invoked when the nation faces a crisis, and prayed for peace and unity.[27] “This is about the children of this country, the women, the men,” said Sheikh Kalhid Djibo Moctar, “the Muslim community which, following the appeal from the religious authorities, has responded to entrust the situation we are experiencing to Allah, so that He can find us an appropriate solution.” Members of the armed forces stood respectfully among those praying and did not display weapons or interfere with the event.[28]
Despite the coup, relations between the mainstream Muslim community and Christian groups have generally remained good. In October 2023, Djalwana Laurent Lompo, the Catholic Archbishop of Niamey, met with the Grand Imam of Niamey, Sheikh Ismael Djibril Karanta, and Pastor Sani Nomao, President of the Association of Evangelical Churches of Niger, reaffirming their commitment to working together and promoting tolerance.[29]
On 21 July 2024, near Tankademi in Niger’s Tahoua region close to the Malian border, over 300 armed assailants ambushed a military unit, killing 237 soldiers and injuring others. While no group claimed responsibility, the area is known for hosting Islamist militant activity. This was the deadliest single attack recorded globally in 2024, highlighting the extreme volatility and reach of jihadist violence in Niger.[30]
In September 2024, the Italian missionary Fr Pier Luigi Maccalli — kidnapped in Niger in 2018 and released in 2020 — returned to the country, which he described as “his home”. His visit, coinciding with the anniversary of his abduction, included emotional meetings with people who had found themselves in centres for displaced people in Makalondi and Torodi. He highlighted their harsh living conditions — lack of shelter, food, medicine, and education — and expressed deep concern over the region’s growing insecurity and persistent fear caused by repeated jihadist attacks.[31]
In December 2024, 39 villagers were killed in two attacks by suspected jihadists in the Tillabéri region near the border with Burkina Faso. The defence ministry reported that 21 people were killed in Libiri and 18 in Kokorou, including children, between 12 and 14 December. The “barbaric acts”, said the ministry, were committed by “criminals” under pressure from ongoing military operations who targeted defenseless civilian populations.[32] “If they reached us, they could rape and kill us,” said Hadjara Zibo, who fled into the hills with her three daughters.[33]
In the same month, Niger's military government suspended the BBC for three months, accusing the network of spreading fake news that could destabilise social peace and demoralise troops fighting jihadists. Although the government did not specify a particular broadcast, the suspension followed BBC coverage of jihadist attacks in the Tillabéri region, which reportedly killed 91 soldiers and nearly 50 civilians.[34]
Between 22 and 25 February 2025, a group described on state radio as “armed bandits” killed 16 villagers in two separate attacks in the Dosso region of south-west Niger, which borders Nigeria and Benin. In the first village of Makani, the raiders gathered residents together and then opened fire on them — a pattern often seen in jihadist attacks. This area, located near the W National Park — a hotspot for jihadist groups — has been regularly plagued by violent attacks, according to Nigerien authorities.[35] In February 2025, Niger’s Defence Minister, Salifou Mody, announced the creation of 5,000-strong joint force comprising soldiers from Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso to tackle the escalating security challenges in the region.[36]
On 21 March 2025, during Friday prayers, armed jihadists carried out a deadly assault on a mosque in the village of Fambita, in the Kokorou district of Niger’s Tillabéri region. According to the Ministry of the Interior and the United Nations, the assailants surrounded the mosque, opened fire on worshippers, and set fire to nearby market stalls and homes. The attack left 44 civilians dead, and 13 others injured. In response, the government declared a three-day period of national mourning. While no group officially claimed responsibility, authorities attributed the attack to the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP).[37]
Prospects for freedom of religion
In the aftermath of Niger’s July 2023 military coup, the bishops of West Africa —particularly from the Regional Episcopal Conference of West Africa (CERAO), Burkina Faso-Niger, and Nigeria — issued a strong appeal against military intervention and bloodshed. They warned that the country risked becoming a “second Libya” and urged all parties to prioritise peace and dialogue. Their appeal — a gesture of spiritual solidarity and regional unity — emphasised prayer as the starting point for reconciliation and called for a peaceful resolution to avoid further suffering in the Sahel.[38]
Two years after the coup, the situation in Niger continues to deteriorate, with a growing number of attacks affecting religious communities — such as the March 2025 assault on a mosque of Fambita in Tillabéri. Politically, the government’s distancing from Western partners raises serious concerns about the future of human rights in the country. Conditions, particularly for Christians and Muslims not accepting of the militant Islamist ideology, remain extremely challenging. The overall outlook for religious freedom in Niger is negative.
Sources
Niger