PAKISTAN
Legal framework on freedom of religion and actual application
Pakistan was founded as a secular state at the time of British India’s partition in 1947. Only gradually did the country’s more militant Muslims assert a distinctly Islamic orientation under the dictatorship of General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, in power from 1977 to 1988, as Islamic law (Shari‘a) played a greater role within the Pakistani legal system.
The population is almost entirely Muslim, mostly Sunnis of which 90 percent follow the precepts of the Hanafi school. Shi‘as are a smaller percentage (10-15 percent). Non-Muslim religious minorities, which include Christians, Hindus and Ahmadis, make up around 3 percent of the population.[1]
The main ethnic groups are Punjabi (44.7 percent), Pashtun (Pathan) (15.4 percent), Sindhi (14.1 percent), Saraiki (8.4 percent), Muhajirs (7.6 percent), Balochi (3.6 percent), and others (6.3 percent).[2]
Pakistan is a signatory to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 2010. It is therefore obliged under Article 18 to protect freedom of thought, conscience and religion for its people.
Although Article 2 of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan (reinst. in 2002, rev. in 2018)[3] states that “Islam shall be the State religion of Pakistan,” the charter also guarantees some religious minority’s rights. In its Preamble, it says that “adequate provision shall be made for the minorities freely to profess and practise their religions and develop their cultures.”[4] Article 20 (a, b) recognises that “every citizen shall have the right to profess, practice and propagate his religion,” and that “every religious denomination and every sect thereof shall have the right to establish, maintain and manage its religious institutions.”
Article 21 establishes that “No person shall be compelled to pay any special tax the proceeds of which are to be spent on the propagation or maintenance of any religion other than his own”. Article 22 (1) regulates “Safeguards as to educational institutions in respect of religion,” clearly stating that “No person attending any educational institution shall be required to receive religious instruction.” Article 22 (3, a) stipulates that “no religious community or denomination shall be prevented from providing religious instruction for pupils of that community or denomination in any educational institution maintained wholly by that community or denomination.” Furthermore, Article 22 (3, b) says that “no citizen shall be denied admission to any educational institution receiving aid from public revenues on the ground only of race, religion, caste or place of birth.”
However, in practice, these provisions appear to be only partially implemented, particularly following the 2021 introduction by the Imran Khan government of the so-called Single National Curriculum (SNC)[5] for primary and religious schools, which was later rebranded as the National Curriculum of Pakistan (NCP) in July 2022.[6] The SNC attracted strong criticism from education experts and human rights advocates for its lack of inclusivity, and its overemphasis on Islamic religious content to the detriment of minority faiths.[7]
In January 2024, Pakistan’s Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training approved the 2023 Religious Education Curriculum (REC), a significant reform for Grades 1 to 12 that addresses long-standing calls for greater inclusivity. Previously, Islamic studies were mandatory for all students, regardless of faith. The new curriculum allows non-Muslim students to study their own religious traditions – Bahá’ísm, Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Kalasha, Sikhism, and Zoroastrianism.[8] Welcomed by minority communities, the reform promotes religious diversity and represents a major step towards equal educational opportunities in Pakistan.[9]
In 2024, Pakistan enacted the Madrasa Registration Bill 2024, formally titled the Societies Registration (Amendment) Act 2024. This legislation constitutes a significant reform aimed at regulating and integrating madrasas (Islamic schools) into the country’s broader educational framework. Approved in December 2024, the law mandates the compulsory registration of all madrasas, the submission of annual reports, and the implementation of financial audits to promote transparency and accountability. The legislation further prohibits content that promotes militancy or sectarianism, encourages the phased inclusion of contemporary academic subjects, and permits comparative religious studies within madrasa curricula. By replacing the outdated Societies Registration Act of 1860 and transferring oversight from local to national authorities, the amendment aims to improve governance and ensure alignment between religious and national educational standards.[10] Nevertheless, despite some positive developments, multiple studies indicate that the path towards eliminating discrimination against minorities in the field of education remains long and challenging, as will be detailed in the incidents section.[11]
A discriminatory provision in the Pakistani constitution is Article 41, which says that, “A person shall not be qualified for election as President unless he is a Muslim”. Article 91 (3) stipulates that the Prime Minister must also be a Muslim. According to Article 203, the Federal Islamic Court has the powers to invalidate any law contrary to Islam or to suggest amendments thereof.[12]
In Article 260 (3, a and b) of the constitution, a distinction is made between Muslims and non-Muslims, which lends to religious-based discriminatory attitudes. It also declares the Ahmadiya community as a non-Muslim minority.
The so-called blasphemy laws, introduced by General Zia-ul-Haq between 1982 and 1986 in the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC)[13] – Sections 295 B, 295 C, 298 A, 298 B, 298 C – severely restrict freedom of religion and expression. Profaning the Qur‘an and insulting Muhammad are both punishable offences, respectively carrying maximum sentences of life imprisonment and death. The concept of “blasphemous” is quite broad, and frequently abused, with various types of conduct punished, including irreverence towards people, objects of worship, customs and beliefs.
By incorporating Sections 298-B and 298-C into the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC), General Zia-ul-Haq made it a criminal offence for Ahmadis to call themselves Muslims, employ terms and appellations associated with the Prophet Muhammad, use Muslim practices in worship or propagate their faith.
General protection against any form of offence and vilification is formally recognised for all religions in Sections 295, 295-A and 298, but Sections 295-B, 295-C, 298-A, 298-B and 298-C typify conduct exclusively referred to the outrage of the Islamic religion. Since the Pakistani legal system is based not only on Common Law but also on Shari‘a, the rules in question are applied only in favour of Islam.[14] It is not coincidental, therefore, that from the birth of Pakistan in 1947 until 1986, only six cases of blasphemy were recorded, while after the introduction of the aforementioned sections, there were 2,449 cases between 1987 and 2023, according to the Lahore-based Centre for Social Justice (CSJ).[15]
Furthermore, the number of members of religious minorities accused of blasphemy is highly disproportionate to their percentage in the population. The highest number of accused (1,279, or 52.23 percent) are Muslims, followed by Ahmadis (783, 31.93 percent), Christians (291, 11.88 percent), Hindus (45, 1.84 percent), while in 52 cases (2.12 percent) the religion of the accused could not be confirmed. This means that 45.6 percent of accusations – amounting to 1,118 cases – are directed at members of minority communities, a figure significantly disproportionate compared to their demographic size, which stands at just 3.5 percent of the population.[16]
Moreover, the high number of murders and violence that occur as a result of blasphemy accusations continues to be a major concern. This is evidenced by cases that occurred during the period under review in Nankana Sahib, Jaranwala, Sargodha, Madyan, and Umerkot.[17] Between 1994 and 2024, a total of 109 individuals accused of blasphemy were killed extrajudicially in mob violence across Pakistan. Among the victims, 67 were Muslims (64 percent), 26 Christians (25 percent), seven Ahmadis, one Hindu, and one Buddhist, while the religious affiliation of two individuals remained unidentified.[18]
A notable development during the reporting period was the unanimous adoption of a resolution by Pakistan’s National Assembly on 23 June 2024, condemning the rise in mob lynching, particularly in Swat and Sargodha. The National Assembly stressed that such acts are intolerable in any civilised society and urged federal and provincial governments to ensure citizen protection – especially for religious minorities and vulnerable groups. It further called on the authorities in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab to promptly investigate and prosecute those responsible.[19] Also noteworthy is the unanimous resolution passed by the Provincial Assembly of the Punjab in June 2024, condemning blasphemy-related violence and underscoring the need to protect all citizens regardless of religious affiliation. The resolution was adopted in response to the lynching of a tourist in Swat, who had been accused of desecrating the Holy Qur‘an.[20]
By incorporating Sections 298-B and 298-C into the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC), General Zia-ul-Haq made it a criminal offence for Ahmadis to call themselves Muslims, employ terms and appellations associated with the Prophet Muhammad, use Muslim practices in worship or propagate their faith.
On 17 January 2023, the National Assembly of Pakistan unanimously passed the Criminal Laws Bill, an amendment to Section 298A of the PPC, which increases the punishment for those who disrespect the wives, family and companions of the Holy Prophet from three to 10 years, in addition to a fine of one million rupees. The draft was presented by Maulana Abdul Akbar Chitrali, a member of the Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan party, who stated that in the case of serious disrespect, the punishment should be increased to life imprisonment.[21] The amendment was formally approved by Pakistan’s Senate on 7 August 2023.[22]
Noteworthy progress occurred in November 2023, when the Supreme Court of Pakistan ordered authorities in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to replace the term “Esai” with “Masihi” in all official references to Christians. The decision, reflecting long-standing demands from the Christian community, recognises “Masihi” as a respectful designation, in contrast to the caste-linked, pejorative connotations of “Esai”. This ruling marks a significant step towards enhancing the dignity and inclusion of Christians in Pakistan.[23]
Despite certain legal developments during the period under review, the National Commission for Minorities (NCM),[24] reconstituted in 2020 to promote interfaith harmony and protect non-Muslims, continues to lack both institutional effectiveness and adequate representativeness.[25] On 7 August 2023, the National Assembly passed the National Commission for Minorities Bill, but two days later the Senate refused to consider it after civil society organisations raised concerns over its ineffectiveness and non-compliance with the UN Paris Principles.[26]
A revised version – introduced in December 2024 – proposes a 13-member body, including nine minority representatives, and emphasises financial and administrative autonomy.[27] However, human rights advocates remain critical, warning that without statutory powers and institutional independence, the commission risks being only symbolic. Critics also denounce the exclusion of the Ahmadi community and argue that keeping the commission under the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MRA) – rather than the Ministry of Human Rights (MHR) – undermines its potential independence and alignment with international standards.[28]
As detailed in the incidents section below, abductions, forced conversions, and marriages continue to affect religious minorities, largely due to the absence of effective legal safeguards. On 13 October 2021, a parliamentary committee rejected a proposed anti-forced conversion bill, following opposition from the MRA, despite protests from minority lawmakers.[29]
In July 2024, Pakistan’s Parliament approved an amendment to the Christian Marriage Act of 1872, raising the minimum legal age for marriage for Christian men and women from 16 to 18. The amendment was enacted on 23 July 2024 after President Asif Ali Zardari signed it into law.[30] While the Christian Marriage (Amendment) Act, 2024 marks a significant step towards the protection of minors, its scope is currently limited to the Islamabad Capital Territory. Under Article 144 (1) of the constitution, provincial assemblies must adopt their own legislation; otherwise, personal laws such as the Child Marriage Restraint Act – which permits marriage for girls at 16 – continue to apply, restricting the amendment’s reach only to the capital.
Despite its progressive aims, the revised law retains several outdated provisions from the original 1872 Act, including vague definitions of authorised officiants and the absence of penalties for procedural violations. Additionally, the ongoing issue of forced religious conversion of Christian girls to Islam before marriage remains a major obstacle: once converted, they fall under Islamic personal law, rendering the protections of the Christian Marriage Act inapplicable, effectively bypassing the safeguards introduced by the amendment.[31]
Pakistan ranks seventh globally in terms of the total number of child marriages, with approximately 19.36 million women reported to have been married before the age of 18.[32]
The number of young Hindu and Christian girls abducted, forcibly converted to Islam, and compelled to marry their abductors continues to rise in Pakistan. According to Hindu and Christian activists, between 500 and 1,000 girls are reportedly forcibly married to Muslim men and coerced into converting to Islam each year. According to data from the Centre for Social Justice (CSJ), 75 percent of the girls affected are under the age of 18, with 18 percent younger than 14. Sixteen percent are identified as adults, while the age of the remaining 9 percent could not be determined.[33]
The escalation in cases is largely attributable to the absence of comprehensive legal protections and the inconsistent enforcement of existing laws. Sindh, which has a particularly high number of such cases, remains the only province to have adopted dedicated legislation – the Sindh Child Marriage Restraint Act (2013) – aimed at preventing underage marriages.[34] Enforced for the first time in 2020, the law has facilitated the return of some abducted girls to their families. Nevertheless, critical shortcomings persist, notably its inability to annul Islamic marriages even when the girl’s minor status is legally established.[35]
The partial success of Sindh’s legislation, compared to the lack of legal recourse in other provinces, underscores the urgent need for similar protections at the national level. Tragically, girls subjected to forced conversion are often prohibited from returning to their original faith. A notable example is Rajeeta Meghwar Kolhi, a Hindu girl abducted in Sindh in August 2024. After escaping captivity two months later, her repeated pleas to be reunited with her family were denied. Instead, the court ordered her placement in a women’s shelter. In contrast, the same court had previously allowed a Muslim girl in a comparable situation to return to her family.[36]
The Sindh Assembly has yet to enact legislation explicitly prohibiting forced conversions. In 2016, the Criminal Law (Protection of Minorities) Bill was unanimously passed by the Assembly; however, it failed to enter into force after the then-governor, under pressure from religious parties, declined to sign it.[37]
Although not directly related to freedom of religion, a restrictive amendment to Pakistan’s Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA), introduced in January 2025, is highly significant due to its potential implications for freedom of expression – particularly for religious minorities and political groups. The revised law imposes harsher penalties for disseminating so-called fake news and grants the Government of Pakistan expanded authority to block digital content. Since its original enactment in 2016, PECA has been widely criticised for its vague language and overly broad provisions.[38] As explored further in this report, several blasphemy cases during the period under review were closely linked to social media activities, making the recent amendments to PECA particularly relevant in this context.
Incidents and developments
In recent years, Pakistan has experienced significant political shifts. The removal of Prime Minister Imran Khan in April 2022 triggered a period of instability. Shehbaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) replaced him on 11 April 2022, amid a worsening economic crisis, prompting a US$ 7 billion bailout by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in July 2024.[39]
In the 8 February 2024 general elections, the PML-N secured 108 seats – insufficient for a majority but enough to form a coalition with the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). Sharif was re-elected Prime Minister on 3 March 2024.[40] The elections were followed by allegations of vote rigging and political interference. Since then, the military has further strengthened its influence over Pakistan’s political, economic, and social spheres.[41]
In recent years, Pakistan has also witnessed a marked deterioration in internal security due to the escalating threat of terrorism. In 2025, the country ranked second on the Global Terrorism Index – its highest position since 2014. In 2024 alone, terrorism-related fatalities rose by 45 percent compared to the previous year, totalling 1,081 deaths. The number of attacks more than doubled, increasing from 517 in 2023 to 1,099 in 2024 – the highest figure recorded since the Global Terrorism Index’s inception. This marked the fifth consecutive year of rising deaths, with the steepest annual increase in the past decade.[42]
The upsurge is closely linked to the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021. The provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, bordering Afghanistan, remain the most severely affected, accounting for over 96 percent of all attacks and fatalities in 2024.[43]
The Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP), aligned with the broader goal of the Islamic State group of establishing a global caliphate, is distinguished by its emphasis on transnational jihad and its extreme brutality. It frequently targets civilians, religious minorities – particularly Shia Muslims – and rival Sunni factions such as the Taliban. As the Taliban intensified their crackdown on ISKP in Afghanistan, many fighters have relocated to Pakistan, where they are building networks in both urban and rural areas. This shift has led to a sharp rise in violence, marked by increasingly sophisticated attacks on security forces, religious minorities, and public events, thereby exacerbating regional instability and deepening sectarian tensions.[44]
Terrorism
During the period under review, numerous terrorist attacks targeted places of worship in Pakistan. One of the most devastating occurred on 30 January 2023, when a suicide bomber detonated explosives inside a crowded mosque within a high-security compound in Peshawar, killing at least 100 people.[45] It was the deadliest attack in the city since the 2013 twin suicide bombing at the All Saints Church.[46]
In 2023, the Sikh community in Pakistan experienced a surge in targeted violence, particularly in Peshawar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. On 24 June 2023, Manmohan Singh, a 35-year-old Sikh man, was fatally shot in what police called a targeted attack. The Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for this killing.[47] This marked the third targeted killing of Sikhs that year, intensifying fears regarding the safety and future of the community. In response, many Sikhs have been compelled to relocate within Pakistan or emigrate.[48]
On 29 September 2023, two suicide bombings targeted religious events in Pakistan: one struck a 12 Rabi-ul-Awwal procession in Mastung, Balochistan, and the other a mosque in Hangu, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The coordinated attacks killed at least 58 people and injured over 80.[49] Although no group formally claimed responsibility, analysts noted similarities with ISKP’s tactics.[50]
Violence against Shi‘as has increased since General Zia-ul-Haq adopted a policy of Islamisation of the country in the 1980s, but the situation has worsened in recent years. On 21 November 2024, gunmen ambushed a convoy of Shi‘a Muslim passengers travelling from Parachinar to Peshawar, in Kurram District, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The attack, which lasted approximately 40 minutes, left at least 42 dead – including six women – and injured around 20 others. Federal Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi condemned the assault as a terrorist act, although no group claimed responsibility.[51]
Blasphemy
As noted in the legal framework, blasphemy cases have increased significantly during the reporting period. According to some of the latest data, at least 225 individuals were accused of blasphemy between January and mid-August 2024. This follows 329 cases recorded in 2023, reflecting a persistently high incidence of blasphemy accusations year after year.[52]
On 11 February 2023, a tragic incident unfolded in Nankana Sahib, Punjab, after Muhammad Waris was accused of blasphemy for allegedly desecrating the Qur‘an. Waris, who was acquitted on similar charges in 2019, was taken into custody at the Warburton Police Station. A mob, incited in part via social media, stormed the station, overpowered police officers, forcibly removed Waris, lynched him, and attempted to set his body on fire.[53]
One of the gravest incidents related to blasphemy allegations took place on 16 August 2023, in Jaranwala, Punjab province, where a violent mob attacked the local Christian community following accusations that two Christian men had desecrated the Qur‘an. The violence resulted in the destruction of at least 22 churches and the burning of over 90 Christian homes. The unrest was reportedly incited by announcements from local mosques and via social media, calling on Muslims to mobilise. In response, hundreds of individuals armed with sticks and stones stormed the Christian neighbourhood.[54] As of the end of June 2024, only two individuals remained imprisoned in connection with the Jaranwala attacks. One is Pervez Kodu, a Christian man accused of contributing to the fabricated blasphemy allegation against the two Christian brothers; the other is a Muslim man. Meanwhile, up to 300 individuals arrested for mob violence have been released, underscoring the persistent lack of accountability in such cases.[55]
The Jaranwala incident was significantly shaped by a disinformation campaign and inflammatory content disseminated via social media. Platforms such as Facebook and WhatsApp played a central role in spreading incitement, including videos urging people to mobilise against Christians accused of blasphemy. False allegations and emotionally charged messaging quickly gained traction, intensifying public outrage. Traditional media further exacerbated the situation. The incident illustrates how digital and broadcast media can be manipulated to incite mob violence, particularly against religious minorities in an atmosphere of fear and intolerance.[56]
A similar pattern of media involvement was observed on 25 May 2024, when Nazir Masih, a 70-year-old Christian man from Sargodha, Punjab, was the victim of a brutal mob lynching following blasphemy allegations. He was severely beaten, his home looted, and his shoe shop set on fire. Despite receiving medical attention, he died from his injuries on 3 June 2024. The case was particularly alarming as the entire assault was filmed and livestreamed on social media, with footage showing multiple individuals attacking the elderly man while others encouraged the violence.[57] In the aftermath, a criminal case was registered against 40 identified and over 400 unidentified suspects. Although more than 60 individuals were initially detained, 52 were soon released on bail, raising serious concerns about accountability and the entrenched impunity in mob violence linked to blasphemy allegations.[58]
In the case of the Sargodha lynching, interviews with family members and local residents revealed that police intervention during the attack was inadequate, and that Nazir Masih was beaten in the presence of law enforcement officers. This account was corroborated by videos circulated on social media platforms, which documented the failure of police to disperse the mob.[59]
Following a fact-finding mission into the Sargodha mob attack, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) concluded that the violence may have originated from a personal dispute, which was subsequently amplified through religious framing to mobilise broader support and incite public outrage. The HRCP report highlights a concerning pattern in Pakistan, wherein individual conflicts are reframed as blasphemy allegations, often resulting in mob violence. It also notes a reported link between the main instigator and Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), a hardline religious political party, raising serious concerns about the manipulation of religious sentiment for personal or political ends.[60]
In some instances, timely police intervention has prevented mob lynchings of individuals accused of blasphemy. In February 2024, an assistant superintendent of police successfully rescued a young woman from a violent mob in a Lahore market after she was accused of blasphemy for wearing a dress featuring Arabic script, which was mistakenly believed to contain Qur‘anic verses.[61]
A study by the National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR) has documented a dramatic rise in blasphemy-related imprisonments in Pakistan, with cases increasing from 11 in 2020 to 767 by mid-2024. The surge is especially acute in the Province of Punjab, which accounted for 594 cases as of July 2024. According to the NCHR, the increase is largely driven by blasphemy accusations related to social media content, particularly targeting younger individuals.[62]
This trend appears closely linked to the operations of organised networks focused on identifying alleged online blasphemy. Among these, the Legal Commission on Blasphemy Pakistan (LCBP) is especially prominent. Largely composed of lawyers from Punjab with conservative and Islamist leanings, the LCBP operates within a wider network of legal and religious actors advocating for the rigorous application of blasphemy laws. These groups have led aggressive campaigns demanding state action, contributing to a spike in online blasphemy complaints. A July 2023 report by the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MRA), based on Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) data, cited over 400,000 complaints, many also linked to accusations of obscenity.[63]
An internal report by the Special Branch of the Punjab Police, titled “The Blasphemy Business”, uncovered a criminal racket that allegedly entrapped victims – primarily young Sunni Muslim men – in fabricated blasphemy cases through blackmail and extortion. Notably, the same group was identified as the complainant in 90 percent of all FIA-registered blasphemy cases. The report estimated at least 300 victims, underscoring the systemic abuse of blasphemy laws and the urgent need for reform.[64]
Other serious incidents of violence linked to blasphemy allegations occurred during the reporting period. On 21 June 2024, in Madyan (Swat Valley), a local tourist was lynched by a mob following accusations of Qur‘an desecration. Disturbing videos widely shared on social media showed a large crowd surrounding the victim’s burning body, underscoring the brutality of the attack.[65]
Another grave incident took place on 7 September 2024, in Umerkot, Sindh, where Dr Shahnawaz Kumbhar was accused of blasphemy over a Facebook post. The allegation triggered violent protests, including attacks on a police station and the burning of police vehicles. Shortly thereafter, Kumbhar was shot and killed in what was described as a police “encounter”, a claim that raised questions amid heightened tensions and calls for accountability.[66]
During the reporting period, numerous individuals in Pakistan were sentenced to death or life imprisonment on blasphemy-related charges. While no executions have been carried out to date in such cases, and higher courts have occasionally overturned convictions, defendants often spend years on death row before acquittal. Even following release, threats to their safety persist, forcing many into hiding or exile due to the ongoing risk of extrajudicial violence and social ostracisation.
On 29 June 2024, Ahsan Raja Masih, a 22-year-old Christian brick kiln worker, was sentenced to death by the Sahiwal Anti-Terrorism Court under multiple provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code. He was accused of sharing an image of a damaged Qur‘an on social media. The court concluded that his actions had offended the sentiments of Muslims and amounted to an attempt to promote religious hatred.[67]
In September 2024, Shagufta Kiran, a 40-year-old Pakistani Christian mother of four, was sentenced to death for blasphemy. She had been arrested on 29 July 2021 in Islamabad for allegedly sharing blasphemous content in a WhatsApp group in September 2020.[68]
Many Shi‘a leaders perceived the amendments to Section 298-A of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) to be targeting their religious beliefs and practices, thereby provoking significant controversy. This perception is rooted, in part, in the theological distinctions within Shi‘a Islam, where critical perspectives on Aisha – the youngest wife of the Prophet Muhammad – exist due to her historical opposition to Ali ibn Abi Talib, whom Shi‘a Muslims regard as the Prophet’s rightful successor.[69] In August 2023, Agha Baqir al-Hussaini, a prominent Shi‘a cleric, was arrested in Skardu, the largest city in the Gilgit-Baltistan region, following his public criticism of the recently amended blasphemy legislation. In a speech, he asserted that Shi‘a Muslims would not abstain from criticising certain historical figures – companions and relatives of the Prophet Muhammad – who had opposed the succession of Ali ibn Abi Talib.[70]
Ahmadis in Pakistan are also frequently accused of blasphemy and face systematic legal and social discrimination pursuant to Sections 295-A and 295-B of the PPC. According to data from the Persecution of Ahmadis website and National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR), the Ahmadiyya Muslim community in Pakistan has faced systematic and sustained persecution. Between 1984 and 9 February 2023, at least 277 Ahmadis were killed[71] and 415 were physically assaulted due to their faith. Beyond personal safety, the community has experienced repeated attacks on its places of worship and burial sites: 31 Ahmadi places of worship have been demolished, 40 sealed by authorities, 29 damaged or set on fire, and 16 forcibly occupied. Additionally, 39 bodies have been exhumed, 96 burials denied, and 99 graves desecrated.[72]
In 2024, at least 36 Ahmadis were arrested in Punjab and Sindh for performing Eid-al-Azha rituals, which they are legally barred from observing as non-Muslims under Pakistani law. Meanwhile, Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) supporters incited violence online. At a May 2024 rally, TLP leader Asim Ashfaq Rizvi publicly threatened to execute Ahmadis engaging in ritual sacrifice, while police looked on without intervening.[73]
The Hindu community in Pakistan also continues to face systemic discrimination. In June 2023, the Higher Education Commission (HEC) directed universities to avoid celebrating Holi, calling the festival incompatible with Pakistan’s Islamic identity and values. The directive, prompted by Holi celebrations at Quaid-i-Azam University, drew widespread backlash and was seen as indicative of the institutional marginalisation of religious minorities, especially in education.[74]
A month later, the Hindu community experienced another direct attack when the 150-year-old Mari Mata Temple in Karachi’s Soldier Bazaar was demolished. The operation took place overnight during a power outage, with bulldozers and diggers. While the temple’s outer walls and gate remained standing, the inner structure was torn down. Witnesses reported a police vehicle present during the demolition, raising concerns about official complicity and the failure to protect minority religious heritage.[75]
This was not an isolated incident. In 2023, there was a significant rise in non-fatal violence against non-Muslim communities and their places of worship, with 193 incidents reported across four regions. Most attacks were concentrated in Punjab and Sindh, provinces traditionally considered less affected by terrorism. More than 60 religious sites were desecrated during the reporting period, including 36 Ahmadi places of worship, 22 churches, two Hindu temples, and one Sikh gurdwara.[76] One such example, among the innumerable cases affecting religious minorities, impacted the Christian community in March 2024, where unidentified individuals desecrated three graves in a cemetery designated for Christians in the Batora area, Swat District.[77]
Forced Conversion
The scourge of girls and young women from religious minorities being kidnapped, raped, and forced to convert to Islam and marry their abductors has continued to grow, with severe consequences for the Christian, Hindu, and, to some extent, Sikh communities.
In January 2023, United Nations experts expressed deep concern over the increasing number of cases in Pakistan involving the abduction, forced religious conversion, and coerced marriage of girls belonging to religious minority communities. They underscored that such practices constitute grave violations of fundamental human rights, including freedom of religion or belief and the rights of the child. The experts called on the Pakistan government to take immediate and effective measures to prevent such abuses, ensure the prosecution of perpetrators, and guarantee justice and adequate protection for victims. They further urged the adoption of comprehensive legislation and the implementation of targeted policies to safeguard religious minorities and other vulnerable groups from such violations.[78]
In June 2023, Kareena Kumari, a young Hindu girl allegedly abducted in Shaheed Benazirabad district, testified in court that she had been forcibly converted to Islam and married to a Muslim man. Following her testimony, the court ordered that she be placed in a women’s protection centre and subsequently returned to her parents.[79] Her father publicly alleged that religious extremists – in particular Mian Abdul Haq (commonly known as Mian Mithu) from northern Sindh – operate so-called conversion factories where non-Muslim girls are abducted and coerced into conversion and marriage.[80]
The Ministry of Religious Affairs organised a seminar in Islamabad on 31 January 2023, during which, according to the Commission, the phenomenon of forced conversions, abductions, and coerced marriages was denied. This caused great dismay and indignation among members of the Christian and Hindu minority communities in attendance.[81]
A notable case is that of Laiba Suhail, a 10-year-old Christian girl from Faisalabad, who was abducted on 11 February 2024, coerced into converting to Islam, and forcibly married to a 35-year-old divorced man, Muhammad Irfan. Despite the availability of official documentation from the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) clearly attesting to her age, initial investigations dismissed allegations of child marriage. A marriage certificate dated 6 March 2024 falsely recorded Laiba’s age as 17. It was only through sustained legal advocacy by her family that Irfan was eventually arrested and additional charges were filed against those implicated in the abduction and document falsification.[82]
One of the most recent cases is that of Ariha Gulzar, a 12-year-old Christian girl from Okara, who was reportedly abducted on 20 January 2025, forcibly converted to Islam, and married to her abductor, Sajjad Baloch. Despite her family’s repeated appeals for legal intervention and protection, Ariha remains in captivity, while her relatives continue to face threats and intimidation.[83]
Members of religious minorities in Pakistan also face pressure and violence for refusing to convert to Islam. A recent example is the case of Waqas Masih, a 22-year-old Christian man who was reportedly assaulted on 22 March 2025 by his supervisor, Zohaib, at Subhan Paper Mills in Sheikhupura, Punjab. According to available reports, the attack followed Waqas’s refusal to embrace Islam, despite sustained pressure from his employer.[84]
Discrimination
Religious minorities in Pakistan also face other forms of discrimination, based on their socio-economic status. A critical issue affecting religious minorities in Pakistan is that of forced labour in the brick kiln industry. An estimated 4.5 million individuals are employed across approximately 20,000 kilns nationwide, with religious minorities disproportionately represented. Although they constitute less than 5 percent of the national population, minorities – particularly Christians and Scheduled Caste Hindus[85] – account for up to 50 percent of the kiln workforce, especially in the provinces of Punjab and Sindh.[86] The combination of low caste and economic status makes proper legal recourse and representation in cases of discrimination nearly impossible.
Recent record-breaking floods have also disproportionately impacted low-income Hindu and Christian communities. In response to extreme weather events, municipal authorities have launched campaigns against informal settlements – predominantly inhabited by these groups – resulting in the demolition of homes and churches built along natural drainage paths. Already affected by residential segregation, displaced families now face the even greater obstacle of resettlement.[87]
Discrimination against religious minorities has also been long embedded in Pakistan’s educational system, particularly in school textbooks. While recent years have seen some improvements, many texts still contain offensive or derogatory content targeting minority communities. A study by the Centre for Social Justice (CSJ) confirms the persistence of such material across various regional curricula, noting biased depictions, moral judgments, and religious stereotypes in 14 percent of textbook chapters in Punjab, five percent in National Book Foundation publications, and 0.7 percent in Sindh. In contrast, textbooks from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan did not include direct hate content. Examples of discriminatory language include expressions like “Hindus’ mentality”, “complete dominance of Hindus over Muslims”, and “anti-Muslim attitudes of Congress”. These narratives foster religious intolerance and hinder efforts to cultivate inclusive and respectful learning environments for students of all backgrounds.[88]
A study by scholar Azam Mairaj highlights the systematic marginalisation of religious minorities in Pakistan – particularly Scheduled Castes and Christians – through manipulation of census data. Scheduled Castes, who once accounted for approximately 34 percent of the minority population, were excluded from the 1981 census and, despite reinstatement in 1998, remain significantly undercounted. A similar trend affected Christians in the 2017 census, which omitted an estimated 730,000 individuals based on expected demographic growth. This statistical erasure has directly impacted political representation, especially after the introduction of separate electorates in 1985, which curtailed the influence of these communities. In contrast, caste Hindus have seen their share rise from 16 percent in early censuses to nearly 44 percent in 2023, partly due to stronger organisational capacity. Mairaj argues that such manipulation constitutes a form of “statistical genocide”, reinforcing systemic discrimination against minorities.[89]
Pakistan’s Shi‘a community too has complained about systemic bias on the part of state institutions. Restrictions were imposed during Muharram, a month of great religious significance for Shi‘a Muslims. In some places, local authorities invoked Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to prohibit traditional Shi‘a processions, citing concerns over public order and potential sectarian unrest. In an unprecedented move, the Islamabad police also imposed a ten-day ban on motorcycle entry and pillion riding in the city’s Red Zone. Although officials pledged to provide alternative transportation, many low-income residents were left with limited options, underscoring the disproportionate impact of such security measures on religious minorities.[90]
The ultimate consequence is that, particularly members of religious minorities in Pakistan – including Christians, Hindus, Ahmadis, and minority Muslim sects –, have been forced to flee their homes, relocate internally, or seek asylum abroad due to persecution, blasphemy accusations, and religious violence. This trend, driven by rising extremism, has persisted for over a decade and continued during the reporting period. Some have gone into hiding; others, facing insecurity and economic hardship, have left the country and remain stranded abroad with their families. In Sindh, Hindu families have increasingly migrated to India, citing forced conversions, extortion, and kidnappings – prompting what some have described as a “silent migration”.[91]
Prospects for freedom of religion
During the period under review, some positive developments were noted in Pakistan, including the adoption of the 2023 Religious Education Curriculum (REC), the National Assembly’s resolution on 23 June 2024 condemning mob lynching, and the Christian Marriage (Amendment) Act, 2024. These measures represent incremental progress towards greater inclusion and legal protection for religious minorities.
However, persistent structural discrimination and a culture of impunity continue to undermine religious freedom – often amounting to persecution. Particularly concerning is the rise in blasphemy accusations, many seemingly fabricated and increasingly linked to social media, along with frequent mob violence following such allegations.
Equally troubling is the expansion of blasphemy legislation through the Criminal Laws (Amendment) Bill, which broadened Section 298-A of the Pakistan Penal Code, reinforcing a legal framework prone to abuse.
These challenges are compounded by deep political and economic instability and the growing influence of extremist groups, exacerbated by the Taliban’s return to power in neighbouring Afghanistan. As a result, the outlook for religious freedom in Pakistan remains negative – for both minority communities and members of the Muslim majority who are also affected by these dynamics.
Sources
Pakistan