Legal framework on freedom of religion and actual application
Somalia has not had a single central government with control over its whole territory since 1991.[1] After a provisional constitution was adopted in August 2012, the country became known internationally as the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS).[2]
The status of religion and religious life is governed by the constitution, though in the country’s regions and sub-regions the legislation varies; for example, the constitution of the FGS recognises the equality of “all citizens, regardless of sex, religion, social or economic status,” (Article 11, 1), while Somaliland’s constitution (Article 8, 1)[3] does not include religion as grounds for equality among its citizens.
In the territory controlled by the FGS, Islam is the state religion (Article 2, 1). No religion other than Islam can be propagated in the country (Article 2, 2), and the president must be a Muslim (Article 88, a).[4] Under Somaliland’s constitution, Islam is also the State religion (Article 5, 1) though both the president and vice president (Article 82, 2) must be Muslim.
The FGS’s provisional constitution guarantees equal rights to all citizens, regardless of their religion. At the same time, however, Article 2 (3) stipulates that legislation must be in harmony with Shari‘a (Islamic law). The same is the case in Somaliland (Article 5, 2).
The FGS’s provisional constitution applies to all citizens, regardless of their religious affiliation. As a result, non-Muslims are also subject to laws that follow the principles of Shari'a. While conversion from Islam to another religion is not expressly prohibited by the FGS’s provisional constitution, it is not accepted at a societal level. Under the constitutions of Somaliland and Puntland, on the other hand, conversion is expressly prohibited.[5]
Neither the Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia[6] nor the country’s Penal Code[7] (which is nominally valid in all parts of the country)[8] specifically forbid conversion from Islam to other religions. Since Sharia serves as a source of national law and Islamic jurisprudence prohibits Muslims from converting to other religions, the relationship between Sharia, the Provisional Federal Constitution, and the enforcement of the Penal Code remains ambiguous.[9] Indeed, at the regional level, the Constitution of Somaliland stipulates that “Islamic Sharia does not accept that a Muslim person can renounce his beliefs” (Article 33, Section 1),[10] thus effectively banning conversions from Islam to other religions.[11] A provision prohibiting Muslims from renouncing their faith can also be found in the Constitution of Puntland (Article 13, 1).[12] Somalia’s authorities and population generally show no tolerance towards converts from Islam, able to remain only if they stay invisible to the public eye.
Islamic religious instruction is mandatory in all public and Muslim schools throughout the country; only a few non-Muslim schools are exempt.[13] All religious communities must register with the Ministry of Religious Affairs. In practice, however, this tends to be haphazard, either because the criteria for registration are not clear, or because the authorities lack the means to enforce the law, especially outside the capital.[14]
In most of the country, the courts rely on xeer, i.e. traditional customary law, Shari‘a, and the Penal Code. The regulation and enforcement of religious practices are policed by each region, often inconsistently.[15]
Since mid-2023, authorities in the Somali cities of Kismayo and Baidoa have reimposed a ban on the niqab — the full-face Islamic veil — citing security concerns amid increased jihadist attacks by groups such as al-Shabaab. Although the ban was first introduced in 2013, enforcement had been minimal until recently. Local police have confiscated and publicly burned niqabs, claiming militants have used them to conceal identities during attacks. While some women support the ban for security and practical reasons, others maintain that wearing the niqab is a matter of religious belief or personal safety, particularly in a context where 60 percent of women report experiencing abuse.[16] In Mogadishu, the niqab remains legal, though women may be required to reveal their faces at security checkpoints. This situation underscores the complex tension between religious freedom, cultural norms, and State security in a country plagued by prolonged conflict and extremism.[17]
In late March 2024, Somalia’s Federal Parliament approved amendments to the first four chapters of the Provisional Constitution, marking a shift toward a more centralised presidential system and the introduction of direct elections. A key reform involves adopting universal suffrage, replacing the traditional clan-based indirect electoral system. These amendments precipitated a constitutional crisis: Puntland rejected the changes, suspended recognition of the federal government, and called for a national referendum, while Jubaland expressed opposition, warning that the reforms threaten federalism and national unity.[18]
On 1 January 2025, the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) formally ended its mandate and has been succeeded by the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), marking the commencement of a structured transition phase. Since late 2024, Somali Security Forces (SSF) have gradually assumed increased security responsibilities, though full operational control remains pending, contingent upon continued funding and international support.[19] However, if the SSF are unable to assume complete security responsibilities, it could cause serious security implications for the continent as al-Shabaab has strong ties to militant groups in Nigeria and other African countries.[20] Furthermore, al-Shabaab continues to characterise the AITMIS forces as “Christian crusaders,” who are intent on invading and occupying the country.[21]
Incidents and developments
Sunni Muslims are estimated to constitute nearly the entire population, with a small minority of Shia Muslims present. Non-Muslim religious groups, including Christians, report severe restrictions on openly practising their faith. Currently, Somalia lacks any functioning places of worship for non-Muslims; the sole exception is the Mogadishu Cathedral, which remains unused for Christian worship due to structural and repair issues.[22]
Somalia’s recent history — marked by decades of civil war, state collapse, and a fragile recovery — continues to profoundly impact religious freedom and all facets of Somali society. Historically, Sufi Islam predominated, fostering an environment of tolerance and coexistence among diverse faiths. However, the enduring power vacuum facilitated the rise of violent Salafist and jihadist groups, notably al‑Shabaab, which has systematically targeted Sufi shrines and sought to suppress traditional religious practices.[23]
In 2024, rising tensions in the Horn of Africa linked to the control of Nile waters have threatened Somalia’s fragile stability, as a complex geopolitical standoff unfolds between Somalia, Somaliland, Ethiopia, and Egypt. In September, Mogadishu condemned what it called illegal arms shipments from Ethiopia to Puntland — an autonomous Somali region — as fears grew of foreign interference in domestic affairs.[24] Tensions had already been developing in January 2024 when Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland, granting Ethiopia access to approximately 20 km of coastline along the Gulf of Aden for naval and commercial use. In return, Ethiopia committed to being the first country to recognize Somaliland’s independence, thereby directly challenging Somalia’s territorial integrity.[25] At the same time, Egypt delivered weapons to Mogadishu under a separate military pact, provoking protests in Ethiopia. This combination of foreign arms transfers and diplomatic manoeuvring risks triggering an arms race, intensifying regional rivalries, and undermining efforts to contain jihadist groups such as al‑Shabaab and the Islamic State. The involvement of external actors and the proliferation of weapons in 2024 have further destabilised an already volatile and divided country.[26]
During the period under review, al‑Shabaab remained the most potent non-state armed actor, controlling extensive rural areas and enforcing a strict interpretation of Shari‘a law. Within its territories, all media, entertainment, smoking, and public expressions deemed “un-Islamic” are prohibited. Men are compelled to grow beards, while women are mandated to wear full head coverings.[27] The group also targets non-Muslims and individuals suspected of ideological deviation, effectively rendering Christians and other religious minorities unable to practice their faith openly.
Al-Shabaab was driven out of Mogadishu in 2011 with international assistance, yet it continues to carry out numerous attacks in the city, the rest of the country, and neighbouring nations.[28] Despite ongoing efforts by the Somali government and international forces, al‑Shabaab continues to pose a severe threat to religious diversity, perpetuating repression and severely limiting spaces for religious freedom in the country.[29]
In April 2023, Catholic Relief Services increased its provision of food, water and health services for people living in camps and without access to basic amenities. Bishop Giorgio Bertin, the apostolic administrator of Mogadishu and the president of Caritas Somalia urged people “not to forget” about Somalia at a time of major world crises.[30]
According to a Lieutenant General, in July 2023, the Somalia National Army killed at least 18 al-Shabaab fighters in the Galgadud region. The area was being used as a weapons depot for the group and was used by militants to develop explosive devices.[31]
In the same month, al-Shabaab set up a complete blockade blocking transport to and from Baidoa, the capital of South-West State. Traders who rely on supplies coming through the blocked route said they would have closed their businesses if the route had not been reopened ten days later after the business community negotiated a deal with al-Shabaab.[32]
On 14 March 2024, al-Shabaab used improvised explosive devices, targeting a hotel in Mogadishu killing four people and injuring 30 others. Outside Mogadishu, on 6 April, al-Shabaab conducted a complex attack in Balcad town, Shabelle Dhexe region, using one improvised explosive device killing a soldier of the Somali National Army.[33]
On 29 March 2024, al-Shabaab terrorists killed six Christian men. The men, from Kenya, sold plastic goods and shared their faith with people in the border town of Dhobley. A Kenyan church near the border between Kenya and Somalia had seen many Muslims secretly attend services, which might have drawn the attention of al-Shabaab.[34]
In May 2024, Mohammad Abdul, a 40-year-old Somali man from Kismayo, was severely injured by Muslim relatives following his conversion to Christianity in March. After embracing the faith, he began praying and reading the Bible with his family and a visiting pastor. When his young child inadvertently disclosed their Christian practices to neighbours, threats against the family escalated. On 5 May, Abdul was attacked with a knife by relatives, sustaining head and hand injuries. Currently living in hiding, Abdul continues to face threats and fears for his life. While he was recovering, his wife and five children were taken away by her family, who warned Abdul not to return to them. His case underscores the profound risks Christian converts face in Somalia, where Islam is the state religion and all laws must conform to Shari‘a, leaving no room for religious freedom.[35]
In August 2024, al-Shabaab killed 37 civilians and injured over 200 others using a suicide bomber at Lido Beach in Mogadishu.[36]
On 5 October 2024, a convert to Christianity was attacked by four of his Muslim relatives after leading a worship service in Somalia’s Lower Juba Region.[37]
In the same month, al-Shabaab militants increased targeting civilians in Mogadishu, particularly those who had been instructed by the government to install CCTV surveillance systems for the businesses in the capital city. In October 2024, there were 10 attacks on business centres and owners in Mogadishu. Every month al-Shabaab operatives extort money from businesses, and the government has mandated the installation of cameras to monitor the money and disrupt al-Shabaab’s sources of funding.[38]
In November 2024, al-Shabaab leader Emir Abu Ubaidah Ahmad Omar framed the group’s armed campaign as a religious struggle, portraying the conflict with Ethiopia as rooted in faith rather than politics or ethnicity. He declared, “The Ethiopian crusade against the Muslims of Somalia is a war that has deeper roots than the Somali-Ethiopian war of 1977. The conflict between us and Ethiopia today is a religious war based on the principles of monotheism. It is a conflict between faith and unbelief, the Quran and the Bible, the mosque and the church.”[39] He urged Somali Muslims to join the mujahideen and support Muslims throughout East Africa. However, Omar’s speech contained several misleading claims designed to legitimize al-Shabaab’s narrative and garner support. He falsely alleged that the Somali government had accepted Ethiopian occupation of the Ogaden region and had ceded Somali ports to Ethiopia — despite these deals being struck by Somaliland, which conflicts with Mogadishu’s federal government. He described the Somali government as a puppet of Ethiopia, ignoring frequent tensions between the two. Omar also claimed al-Shabaab alone expelled Ethiopian troops from Mogadishu, omitting Somali forces and international allies’ crucial roles. Finally, he suggested a UN conspiracy to transfer Somali ports to Ethiopia, an unsubstantiated allegation intended to inflame public resentment.[40]
In December 2024, a Muslim convert to Christianity was beaten and banished from her home after her mother-in-law discovered that she had converted to Christianity. The woman had to leave her two children behind and fled to an underground church in the north-west Mudug Region.[41]
Intense fighting between clans in the Mudug region of the country displaced thousands of people and killed hundreds forcing many to flee the region. The inter-clan conflicts over scarce resources provide an opening for the al-Shabaab operatives to establish themselves and gather support.[42]
In Somalia, daily life for Christians — particularly those who have converted from Islam — remains extremely dangerous. Adherents must practise their faith in complete secrecy, as being identified as a Christian can lead to forced displacement, imprisonment, or even death. In 2024, International Christian Concern (ICC) met with members of an underground church in Mogadishu, who reported over 1,500 hidden believers. Many of these converts face rejection from their families and communities, compelling them to live clandestinely and depend on a network of safe houses managed by trusted church leaders.[43]
Women face particularly harsh repercussions, such as public humiliation, sexual violence, abduction, forced marriage, or house arrest. In territories controlled by al-Shabaab, where Shari‘a law is strictly applied, apostasy is punishable by death, leaving Christian converts without legal protection or public support.[44]
According to the United Nations, al‑Shabaab has persistently abducted and killed humanitarian aid workers throughout Somalia, often alleging that they seek to convert local populations to Christianity.[45]
An additional threat to religious freedom stems from ISIS-Somalia. Since breaking away from al-Shabaab in 2015, IS-Somalia has evolved into a crucial financial and logistical hub for ISIS operations in Africa, primarily based in Puntland’s Cal Miskaat mountains. Though its military capabilities remain limited compared to al-Shabaab, it controls significant funding, recruits foreign fighters, and pursues territorial expansion. Its rivalry with al-Shabaab has intensified, with IS-Somalia regaining ground between 2023 and 2024. Weak coordination between Mogadishu and Puntland has further strengthened its influence. If left unchecked, IS-Somalia poses a growing threat to regional stability and religious freedom across East Africa.[46]
In Puntland, a semi-autonomous region in north-eastern Somalia, escalating violence linked to ISIS-affiliated jihadist groups threatens regional stability. On 31 December 2024, a suicide bombing and armed attack targeting a Vice President of Parliament, Mohamed Baari Shire — perpetrated by assailants reportedly from Morocco, Tanzania, Yemen, and Libya — highlighted the growing insecurity and the transnational nature of the threat. Although Puntland security forces repelled the assault, the incident underscores ongoing competition between ISIS and al‑Shabaab for control over resources and strategic routes.
Shire, noted for his focus on development and governance reform, has gained public support following the attempt on his life. In response, the Puntland government is collaborating with local organisations, such as the Puntland Development Research Centre, to implement social and economic programs aimed at reducing youth susceptibility to radicalisation, including investments in education, healthcare, and employment opportunities.[47]
Prospects for freedom of religion
The situation for religious freedom in Somalia remains critical. Al‑Shabaab, controlling large rural territories and able to attack urban areas, enforces a strict interpretation of Shari‘a law that bans public expressions deemed “un-Islamic”, mandates specific dress codes, and forbids non-Muslim worship. Christian converts must worship secretly, often relying on covert safe houses. Throughout 2023 and 2024, violent acts including abductions, forced displacement, assaults, and killings targeted Christians and suspected proselytisers, including aid workers.
Moreover, ISIS–Somalia is gaining influence, especially in Puntland, exacerbating regional instability. Somalia’s fragmented federal system and tensions between Mogadishu and autonomous regions hinder effective countermeasures. Consequently, the outlook for religious freedom remains bleak, with militant violence, extremist law enforcement, and limited state control perpetuating persecution of religious minorities, particularly Christian converts.