TÜRKİYE
Legal framework on freedom of religion and actual application
The Turkish constitution defines the country as a secular state (Article 2)[1] and guarantees freedom of conscience, religious belief, conviction, expression and worship. Article 24 prohibits discrimination on religious grounds and the exploitation or abuse of “religious feelings, or things held sacred by religion”.
Religious matters come under the jurisdiction of the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet),[2] a state agency established in 1924 (Article 136) to replace the Ottoman-era religious authority (Shayk al-Islam) after the abolition of the Caliphate.[3] In its 2025 budget proposal to parliament, the Turkish government requested an allocation of TR₺130.1 billion (approximately US$3.8 billion) for the Diyanet. This amount exceeds the proposed budgets of six ministries, including the Ministries of the Interior and Foreign Affairs.[4]
Under Türkiye’s 1982 constitution, imposed following the 1980 military coup, religious instruction became mandatory in state-run primary and secondary schools, where only Sunni Islam is taught.[5] Since President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power more than 20 years ago, Türkiye’s education system has undergone a further process of Islamisation.[6]
Despite rulings by the European Court in 2008 and 2014, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers has expressed profound regret that Islamic religious culture and ethics classes in Türkiye continue to be mandatory. The exemption process remains highly restrictive, often necessitating that parents disclose their personal religious or philosophical beliefs.[7] Only Christian or Jewish students are eligible to apply for an exemption from these classes upon the request of their parents.[8] The government refuses to exempt Alevis[9] and other faiths from compulsory Sunni Islamic education.[10]
The government interprets restrictively Article 38 of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which refers to “non-Muslim minorities,”[11] and has therefore granted special legal minority status only to three recognised groups: Armenians, Greeks and Jews. Despite their special status, Jews, like other minority groups (such as Catholics, Syriacs, Protestants, Alevis), have no legal personality and cannot as a group buy or own properties or seek legal redress. Currently, these groups can own property through minority foundations and associations.[12]
The State only allows the training of Sunni clerics while restricting that of other religious groups. The Greek Orthodox Theological Seminary, on Halki Island near Istanbul, was closed by the state in 1971. The Patriarchate remains steadfast in its call for the Halki Seminary to be reopened under its pre-1971 status, a request reiterated on numerous occasions.[13]
In Türkiye, blasphemy is governed by Article 216 of the Penal Code, which states that “A person who publicly provokes hatred or hostility in one section of the public against another section which has a different characteristic based on social class, race, religion, sect or regional difference, which creates an explicit and imminent danger to public security shall be sentenced to a penalty of imprisonment for a term of one to three years.”[14]
In June 2022, Türkiye reinstated board elections for minority religious foundations following a nine-year suspension.[15] However, the newly issued regulations introduced restrictive provisions — such as residency and district-based eligibility criteria — which have been widely criticized as mechanisms for sustaining state oversight over non-Muslim communities.[16]
In August 2022, Armenian Patriarch Sahak Maşalyan and Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew strongly criticised the Turkish government’s new electoral regulations for non-Muslim religious foundations. In a letter to President Erdoğan, Maşalyan conveyed the Armenian community’s dissatisfaction, warning that the restrictive nature of the rules could result in an election boycott and he called for the adoption of fair and inclusive procedures.[17] Bartholomew condemned the prolonged ban on board elections for minority foundations as a “great injustice” and criticised the exclusion of minority-administered hospitals from the electoral process, highlighting their essential role within their respective communities.[18]
The implementation of the regulations has remained uneven. Notably, the Balıklı Greek Hospital Foundation has been unable to proceed with elections due to persistent administrative obstacles, despite a December 2023 Constitutional Court ruling mandating state facilitation of the process.[19]
In August 2024, the General Directorate of Immigration Management stated that 4,250,230 foreign nationals were legally present in Türkiye, mostly Syrians under temporary protection.[20] Turkish legislation provides people in need of international protection with a broad range of rights upon registration with the authorities.[21] Nevertheless, the current legal framework addressing the refugee issue in Türkiye has significant gaps, particularly due to the scale of the ongoing refugee crisis.
Incidents and developments
During the period under review, some incidents indicate a trend towards greater influence of the majority religion in both Turkish society and state institutions.
In June 2023, the Eğitim-İş union, with the support of Hasan Efe Uyar, vice president of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), organised protests against the ÇEDES project — an acronym for Çevreme Duyarlıyım Değerlerime Sahip Çıkıyorum (‘I am Sensitive to my Environment, I Stand Up for my Values’) — which mandates the appointment of imams and preachers as ‘spiritual counsellors’ in schools, and an additional two hours weekly of Sunni Islamic religion classes for middle school students. The union denounced the project as a violation of the principle of secular education and an attempt to integrate unqualified religious groups into the public school system.[22]
Each year, tensions rise between Muslim extremists and secular Turks over the celebration of New Year’s Eve. This has been accompanied with an increase in hate speech directed at Christians as the holiday approaches. Secular Turks have been observing New Year’s Eve (31 December) since the early days of the republic. The celebration, which includes the display of Christmas trees in homes and public spaces, is often viewed by Muslim extremists as a “Christian” tradition. Over time, criticism and hostility toward New Year’s Eve have become part of the official position of the government with public attacks on Christmas trees and disputes in media. In late 2023, the Ministry of National Education introduced a regulation banning Christmas and Easter celebrations in private schools, claiming that they run counter to “national and cultural values”.[23]
In 2023 and 2024, antisemitic attacks have been reported. On 14 March 2023, at an inter-high school football tournament, the Üsküdar American High School football team celebrated their goal against Ulus Private Jewish High School with a collective Nazi salute.[24]
On 17 June 2023, Yazidis in the Viranşehir district of Şanlıurfa reported systematic attacks as they sought to reclaim their property. Community members expressed grievances over repeated incidents, including vandalised graves, damaged vehicles and deliberate cutting of irrigation pipes essential to their farmland.[25]
Members of the Jewish community expressed concern that the government’s anti-Israel rhetoric was openly fuelling antisemitism. On 18 October 2023, a Samsun City Council member for the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) reportedly praised Hitler’s actions against Jews.[26] Antisemitic rhetoric and hate speech persisted in social and print media, intensifying in response to Israel’s actions in Gaza following the 7 October 2023 Hamas terrorist attacks. For example, after the Israel-Hamas conflict broke out, an article in the Islamic daily Yeni Akit suggested the government strip Turkish Jews serving in the Israeli military of their citizenship.[27] On 20 November 2023, a group staged a protest near the Or-Ahayim Jewish Hospital in Balat, Istanbul, in opposition to Israel. Dressed in white doctors’ coats, the protesters symbolically applied red handprints to each other’s clothing to evoke the image of bloodshed.[28]
Alevis are the second-largest Islamic sect in Turkey, accounting for approximately 16.5 percent of the population. Alevi demands for state recognition have long been denied and cemevis (Alevi houses of worship) are not officially recognized by the state.[29] According to the Norwegian Helsinki Committee, seven cases of hate crimes occurred against the Alevi community in 2023 including: a 15 February attack on an Alevi lodge in Istanbul, a 10 June desecration and damage to an Alevi shrine in Malatya, and 10 August threats against — and physical attack on — Alevis in Istanbul.[30]
On 15 August 2023, ahead of the tenth celebration of the Feast of the Virgin Mary at the historic Sumela Monastery in Trabzon, certain political parties and groups criticised the event. The monastery, a significant site of pilgrimage in Türkiye, became the focus of a campaign calling for the Mass to be cancelled.[31] The Dormition of Mary celebration at Sumela has become increasingly politicised, amid tensions involving the Orthodox community, the Turkish government and nationalist circles. In 2024, the event was postponed from 15 to 23 August following criticism, particularly as the original date coincided with the anniversary of Trabzon’s Ottoman conquest. Retired Rear Admiral Cihat Yaycı claimed the celebration was unconstitutional and politically motivated, objecting to the participation of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople and linking the event to the Fethullah Gülen movement. Due to the backlash and increasing hate speech, Patriarch Bartholomew chose not to attend — the first time he had missed the ceremony since 2010.[32]
On 26 September 2023, the online news portal Duvar, reported that a door at Hagia Sophia in Istanbul had been damaged. The incident added to growing concern about the site, which has drawn attention for visible deterioration following an increase in visitor numbers since its reconversion into a mosque. Hagia Sophia, officially renamed “Hagia Sophia-i Kebir Mosque-Sheriff” upon its reopening on 24 July 2020, has suffered significant wear and tear, especially to its main door.[33] Since the reconversion, visitors wishing to access the upper levels where the mosaics are displayed are required to pay a 25-euro entrance fee.[34]
On 23 January 2024, two masked men carried out an armed attack at the Church of Santa Maria in Istanbul’s Sarıyer district leaving one person dead. Witold Lesniak, the Consul General of Poland, and his family were present in the church during the incident.[35] Of the 34 suspects brought before a court, 25 were remanded into custody. The Islamic State group later claimed responsibility for the attack. The authorities detained a total of 60 individuals in connection with the case, deporting 26.[36] Following the incident, the Apostolic Vicar of the Latin Catholic Church in Istanbul, Bishop Massimiliano Palinuro, thanked the government for their supportive response to the Latin Catholic Church and their swift resolution of the murder case.[37]
On 4 April 2024, under Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, Diyarbakır prosecutors launched an investigation into President Nahit Eren and 10 executive board members of the Diyarbakır Bar Association for “Denigrating the Turkish Nation, State, and its Institutions” over a 24 April 2021 statement commemorating the victims of the Armenian genocide. Between 2017 and 2023 the Diyarbakır Bar Association has faced seven investigations, five of which turned into trials, four of which ended in acquittal.[38]
In June 2024, the Constitutional Court of Türkiye ruled that the expulsion of Protestant leaders and pastors based on intelligence reports did not violate religious freedom. Authorities applied Code N-82, which requires prior authorisation for the entry of resident Protestants, citing concerns over public order and security. The decision was based on intelligence reports describing missionary activity as a potential risk. The Protestant community — which has over 170 churches across Turkey — has long reported abuses, including revoked residency permits, forced deportations and entry bans. Many religious leaders challenged the government’s decision in court, but lower courts upheld the measures, stating that the individuals concerned could have applied for special permits or appropriate visas.[39]
In August 2024, Türkiye’s Regional Directorate of Foundations ordered the temporary closure of the Bursa Protestant Church, also known as the French Church, citing earthquake safety concerns. The Bursa Protestant Church Life and Culture Foundation opposed the decision, arguing that an independent assessment had found the structural risks to be less severe than claimed by authorities. The church, built in the 19th century and restored in 2002-2004, is the only active Christian place of worship in Bursa, serving Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant communities. In a statement on 20 August 2024, the Foundation urged the authorities to reverse the closure order, as it would leave local Christian communities without a place of worship.[40]
On 23 August 2024, the Aya Lefter Greek Orthodox Cemetery in Kurtuluş, Istanbul, was attacked. Several graves were damaged, and sections of the ground were dug up, raising concerns among the local community.[41]
In September 2024, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew's expressed optimism to the press about the possible opening of the Halki Theological Seminary.[42] The Patriarchate envisions the seminary as a centre for training Orthodox Christians of all nationalities and seeks the reinstatement of foreign teachers, as was customary in the past. This would allow the seminary to retain its autonomy and preserve its identity as a theological institution dedicated to preparing candidates for the priesthood, while resisting secularisation contrary to its core mission.[43] By keeping the Halki Seminary closed for more than five decades, Turkish authorities have persistently violated the religious rights of its Christian citizens. This contravenes the Orthodox Church’s right to educate its clergy, violating the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne,[44] the European Convention on Human Rights,[45] and other binding international frameworks on human and minority rights.
In 2024, Türkiye officially reconsecrated the fourth-century Church of St Saviour in Chora into a mosque, dismissing international criticism that the move — following its removal from the World Heritage List as a museum — could harm the country’s cultural heritage. Restorations uncovered most of the ancient church’s medieval mosaics and frescoes, sparking international concern. Now officially known as Kariye Kamii, the former church held its first Muslim prayers in nearly 80 years on 6 May 2024, during a reopening ceremony led by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
Much of the building’s religious artwork remains visible despite traditional Islamic prohibitions on iconic images of sentient beings. Mosaics and frescoes in the entrance and side chapel remain unobstructed, but three depictions of the Virgin Mary and Christ inside the nave — now designated for men’s prayers — are concealed behind curtains, which are drawn back when the space is not in use for worship, according to the Turkish Ministry of Culture.[46] Tourists wishing to visit Kariye Camii must pay an entrance fee of 20 euros.[47]
Prospects for freedom of religion
Religious freedom in Türkiye faces increasing challenges, with intolerance and hate speech against minorities — particularly Yezidis, Alevis, Jews and Christians — becoming more frequent. While Protestant and Latin Catholic Churches have gained partial legal recognition through associations or foundations, this arrangement remains unsatisfactory, though it enables them to acquire places of worship.
A major issue for Christian communities is the lack of seminaries for training clergy. Only Sunni Islam is officially taught in schools, and non-Sunni families must formally request exemptions from compulsory religious education. Without clear legal protections, non-Sunni students continue to face discrimination. One rare positive development is the potential reopening of the Halki Seminary, which Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew welcomed in 2024.
The prospects for freedom of religion in Türkiye remain negative.
Sources
Türkiye