Sub-Saharan Africa
Marta Petrosillo
During the period under review, Africa remained the region most affected by jihadist activity. The violence stems not from a single entity but from a decentralised network of affiliated movements operating autonomously but sharing ideology, tactics, and resources. These movements exploit porous borders and weak governance to expand across regions, forming a loosely coordinated structure. Despite their independence, they exchange weapons, fighters, and propaganda, enhancing their resilience and reach. Their adaptability has had devastating consequences for civilians, including Christian communities. This transnational and flexible model allows jihadist actors to thrive amid ongoing instability (see main topic on The Evolution of Jihadism).
According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, militant Islamist groups remain a major source of instability across five regions of the continent. In 2024 alone, these groups were responsible for 22,307 deaths.[1]
Escalation of jihadist violence in the Sahel
The Sahel remains the region of the world most affected by terrorism and jihadist violence, accounting for over half of all terrorism-related deaths in 2024. As reported in the Global Terrorism Index 2025, five of the ten countries most impacted by terrorism are in this region—Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Cameroon—highlighting its central place in the current wave of extremist violence.[2]
Burkina Faso remained the hardest-hit country globally in 2024, accounting for 20 percent of all terrorism-related deaths despite a 21 percent decline from the previous year. Since 2015, jihadist violence has surged, turning the country—once a model of religious harmony—into the epicentre of extremist activity in the Sahel.[3] Groups like JNIM, Islamic State affiliates, and Ansarul Islam target both Muslim and Christian communities, often attacking places of worship. Religious leaders have been abducted or killed, and Christian communities displaced or banned from practising publicly. In mid-2024, nearly 100 Christians were killed in the Zekuy-Doumbala region.[4]
Mali has experienced a steady decline in security and fundamental rights, becoming one of the world’s most terrorism-affected countries. The crisis began in 2012, when the infiltration of extremist groups into northern Mali reignited the Tuareg rebellion. Representing about ten percent of the population, the Tuareg, through the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), sought northern autonomy and temporarily allied with Islamist groups such as AQIM, MUJAO, and Ansar Dine to expel government forces.[5] The 2015 peace agreement has since collapsed. The withdrawal of UN peacekeepers in 2023 and the deployment of Russian Wagner mercenaries further deepened the crisis. Jihadist violence has intensified across the country, with civilians—including Christians—suffering abductions, abuse, and the imposition of religious rules. In 2024, the junta suspended political activity and cracked down on dissent. The situation remains critical, with fears of civil conflict and continued human rights violations.
Niger has faced a sharp decline in security, governance, and human rights under the military junta led by General Abdourahamane Tchiani. A Transitional Charter adopted in March 2025 launched a 60-month transition, formally protecting religious freedom but in an increasingly volatile context. The country has become a major jihadist hotspot, with ISSP, al-Qaeda affiliates, and Boko Haram active nationwide. The Tillabéri region, near Mali and Burkina Faso, remains the epicentre of attacks. In 2024, Niger saw a 94 percent rise in terrorism-related deaths—the world’s highest increase. [6] Both Muslim and Christian communities have suffered, with attacks on churches, mosques and religious gatherings, and abductions of leaders. There have been some efforts at interfaith dialogue, but radical networks, institutional fragility, and authoritarianism have eroded civil space and resilience. Christian minorities remain especially at risk, facing threats, forced conversions, and worship restrictions.
In July 2024, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger formalised their alliance by establishing the Confederation of Sahel States (CSS), following their coordinated withdrawal from ECOWAS.[7] This development signals a broader realignment away from Western institutions, as these military-led regimes strengthen their partnerships with Russia and China.
Coups, elections and constitutional changes: a shift in governance
Between 2023 and 2025, Sub-Saharan Africa experienced a wave of coups and constitutional overhauls that reflected deeper governance crises and often had direct consequences for religious freedom. Two successful coups (Niger[8] and Gabon[9]) and a number of failed attempts (Burkina Faso,[10] Guinea-Bissau[11] and DRC[12]) occurred in this period.
Other countries adopted or proposed significant constitutional reforms, many of which sparked controversy or had adverse consequences. In the Central African Republic, a 2023 referendum abolished term limits and created a vice-presidency, enabling President Touadéra to run for a third term in December 2025.[13] Chad’s December 2023 referendum reintroduced a semi-presidential system, a Prime Minister, a Senate, and a human rights commission, though accountability remains uncertain. In late 2024, a new constitution was promulgated in Gabon[14] and the government launched a national dialogue to revitalise its democratic institutions after 54 years under the Bongo dynasty.[15] In March 2024, Togo’s Parliament approved a new constitution that critics argue undermines democracy, transitioning the country to a parliamentary system and effectively removing term limits for President Gnassingbé, who has been in power since 2005.[16]
In 2024, elections were scheduled in 19 African countries, but many were postponed, manipulated or held under authoritarian conditions. Military regimes in Burkina Faso,[17] Mali,[18] Guinea[19] and Guinea-Bissau[20] failed to deliver on their pledges for a democratic transition, while major national elections were held in Mauritania,[21] Chad,[22] Senegal,[23] and Togo.[24] In South Africa, Catholic bishops described the electoral process as “overwhelmingly free and fair”. [25]
The Horn of Africa: civil wars, religious violence and regional spillover
The Horn of Africa remains deeply unstable, with overlapping civil wars, extremist threats, and cross-border tensions.
Since April 2023, Sudan has experienced civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, triggering the world’s largest displacement crisis with nearly 13 million people uprooted.[26] Both factions have bombed religious sites, tortured clergy, and turned churches and mosques into military bases. Christians have suffered forced conversions, arbitrary detention, and violent attacks as religious freedom sharply deteriorates.
The violence has affected South Sudan, where the influx of refugees and retaliatory ethnic violence have destabilised the country’s fragile peace process. The transitional government has postponed elections and is struggling to draft a permanent constitution.[27]
The situation in Somalia remains critical. Al‑Shabaab controls large rural areas and enforces an extreme version of Shari‘a, forbidding Christian worship, punishing apostasy with death, and targeting anyone deemed “un-Islamic”. Christian converts must practise in secret, risking violence, imprisonment or death. ISIS-Somalia is also expanding, particularly in Puntland, adding to instability. Tensions with Ethiopia and Somaliland, combined with arms inflows and internal clan conflict, further undermine efforts to curb jihadist violence.[28]
After Somalia, Kenya has been the country most affected by violence linked to al-Shabaab.[29] Long regarded as a regional stabiliser, Kenya has come under pressure from cross-border attacks and internal religious tensions. In 2023 and 2024, dozens of attacks were recorded in Mandera, Lamu, and Garissa counties, targeting civilians, including Christians. At the same time, discrimination against Muslims has remained a source of tension. A positive development came in February 2025, when President William Ruto abolished the vetting system imposed on Muslims applying for national identification cards[30]—a move welcomed by civil society as a step toward reducing marginalisation. Despite these challenges, interfaith relations across the country have largely remained peaceful.
Religious freedom in Ethiopia remains precarious amid persistent conflict and political instability. Ongoing violence in Tigray, Oromia, and Amhara has severely affected religious communities, leading to the destruction of places of worship, the killing of clergy, and the disruption of religious activities. The intersection of religious and ethnic identities has further undermined interfaith cohesion. At the regional level, counterterrorism cooperation has come under strain due to tensions with the Somali government—tensions exacerbated by Ethiopia’s agreement with Somaliland.
Across the Horn of Africa, religious freedom is threatened not only by jihadist violence but also by state-led repression. In Eritrea, government policy effectively criminalises unauthorised religious practice, with dissenters facing arbitrary arrest, torture, and prolonged detention. Christians, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Muslims—including minors and clergy—are routinely targeted. Religious gatherings are banned, and detainees are held in inhumane, overcrowded conditions without due process. Under Eritrea’s authoritarian regime, conditions for religious freedom remain critically poor.
Nigeria: Religious communities under assault
Nigeria witnessed a surge in religiously motivated violence between January 2023 and December 2024, particularly in the North and the Middle Belt. Armed groups such as Boko Haram, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and various militias carried out large-scale attacks on churches, villages and religious leaders. In Plateau and Benue States, thousands were displaced and hundreds killed, including more than 1,100 Christians—among them 20 clergy—in just one month following the 2023 presidential inauguration.[31] During Christmas 2023, coordinated attacks by local and foreign militants left nearly 300 dead.[32] In June 2025, around 200 displaced Christians were massacred in Benue.[33]
Radicalised Fulani herdsmen continue to be implicated in attacks against Christian communities, often involving land seizures and displacement. While some analysts frame the conflict in environmental terms, local Church leaders described it as a deliberate strategy to expel Christian populations (see the backgrounder on Fulani and Jihadism in Africa: between legacy and manipulation). In May 2024, a Christian high school was attacked in Makurdi[34]—an unprecedented escalation. Blasphemy accusations and witchcraft-related killings added to the toll, including public lynchings.
Religious leaders and clergy were frequent targets, with dozens kidnapped or murdered. Islamist groups also clashed with authorities, such as during the deadly police crackdown on a Shi’a procession in Abuja. Meanwhile, religious police (hisbah) continued to enforce Shari‘a-based restrictions in several northern states, despite federal constitutional prohibitions.
Central and Southern Africa: emerging Fronts
The Democratic Republic of the Congo is experiencing one of the most severe and multifaceted crises in Sub-Saharan Africa. Armed groups such as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), affiliated with the Islamic State, have systematically attacked Christian communities, killing civilians, destroying places of worship and abducting clergy. In the eastern provinces, more than 120 militias[35] compete for control of mineral-rich areas, while the collapse of public services and the weak presence of the State leave religious communities particularly exposed. The conflict transcends national borders: the M23 rebel group, backed by Rwanda, and Uganda’s military operations against the ADF demonstrate the extent of regional involvement. In January 2025, M23 captured Goma, resulting in mass civilian casualties and large-scale displacement. At the same time, Churches engaged in peace advocacy have faced retaliation from state authorities.[36] As violence escalates and religious communities lose access to safe spaces and basic protections, the conditions for religious freedom in eastern DRC continue to deteriorate, threatening broader stability across the Great Lakes region.
Mozambique has witnessed a renewed surge in jihadist violence in Cabo Delgado, where Islamic State-affiliated militants have continued to attack Christian communities, burn churches and kill civilians. Despite the presence of international military forces, the insurgents have expanded into new districts, taking advantage of weak state control and governance vacuums. Despite this context, religious communities—particularly the Catholic Church—have remained actively engaged in promoting peace and interreligious dialogue. The Interfaith Declaration of Pemba, signed in 2022 by Christian and Muslim leaders, reaffirmed their shared commitment to preventing the instrumentalisation of religion. In 2024, the Islamic Council of Mozambique signalled its willingness to mediate with jihadist elements. These efforts underscore the resilience of religious actors in the face of growing insecurity (see case study on The Church’s active role in Cabo Delgado).
Migrations
Another critical issue affecting Sub-Saharan Africa is the sharp rise in displacement and migration, both within and across national borders. By the end of 2024, the region hosted 38.8 million internally displaced persons—nearly half of the global total.[37] In East Africa, the Horn of Africa, and the Great Lakes regions, 5.4 million refugees and asylum seekers were recorded.[38] Cross-border migration within the continent has also increased, with the number of Africans residing in other African countries rising from 12 million in 2015 to 15 million in 2024—a 25 percent increase.[39] Much of this displacement has been fuelled by escalating jihadist violence (see main topic on Fleeing from religiously motivated persecution and discrimination).
[1] Africa Surpasses 150,000 Deaths Linked to Militant Islamist Groups in Past Decade, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 28th July 2025, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/en-2025-mig-10-year/ , (accessed 10th August 2025).
[2] “Global Terrorism Index 2025: Measuring The Impact of Terrorism,” Institute for Economics & Peace, March 2025, https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Global-Terrorism-Index-2025.pdf, (accessed 10th August 2025).
[3] Ibid.
[4] Sina Hartet and Maria Lozano, “ACN denounces new Islamist massacres in Burkina Faso,” Aid to the Church in Need International, 30th August 2024, https://acninternational.org/acn-denounces-new-islamist-massacres-in-burkina-faso/ (accessed 10th July 2025).
[5] Mali crisis: Key players, BBC News, 12th March 2013, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17582909 , (accessed 21st August 2025).
[6] “Global Terrorism Index 2025: Measuring The Impact of Terrorism,” op.cit
[7] “Defining a new approach to the Sahel’s military-led states,” International Crisis Group, 22nd May 2025, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/burkina-faso-mali-niger/defining-new-approach-sahels-military-led-states (accessed 10th July 2025).
[8] “The coup in Niger,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, August 2024, https://www.iiss.org/sv/publications/strategic-comments/2023/the-coup-in-niger/ (accessed 26th August 2025).
[9] Dipo Faloyin, “A coup in Gabon seems to have ended one family's 56-year rule,” Vice News, 10th August 2023, https://www.vice.com/en/article/a-coup-in-gabon-seems-to-have-ended-one-familys-56-year-rule/ (accessed 15th June 2024).
[10] Wycliffe Muia, “Burkina Faso army says it foiled ‘major’ coup plot”, BBC News, 22nd April 2025, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c5ygxzpkvzno (accessed 19th August 2025).
[11] B. Rukanga & N. Booty, “Guinea-Bissau: Attempted coup was foiled, says President Embaló”, BBC News, 3rd December 2023, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-67586556 (accessed 19th August 2025).
[12] Wedaeli Chibelushi, “US and British citizens among 37 sentenced to death in DR Congo coup trial”, BBC News, 13th September 2024, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cx2e2v2le8wo (accessed 19th August 2025).
[13] Booty, N. and Akinpelu, Y. “Central African Republic President Toudera wins referendum with Wagner hep,” BBC, 7th August 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66428935 (accessed 27th February 2025).
[14] Constitution Gabonaise 2024, République Gabonaise, https://www.gouvernement.ga/object.getObject.do?id=3958 (accessed 27th December 2024).
[15] Gérauds Wilfried Obangome, “Gabon takes historic step towards democratic renewal,” Africanews, 13th August 2024, https://www.africanews.com/2024/04/03/gabon-takes-historic-step-towards-democratic-renewal (accessed 15th June 2024).
[16] Natasha Booty and Nicolas Negoce, “Togo constitution: Parliament passes reforms likened to coup,” BBC News, 20th April 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68860091 (accessed 8th June 2024).
[17] Sofia Christensen, Burkina Faso junta leader says no elections until the country safe for voting, Reuters, 29th September 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-junta-leader-says-no-elections-until-country-safe-voting-2023-09-29/, (accessed 10th August 2025).
[18] Morgane Le Cam, In Mali, democracy has been indefinitely postponed, Le Monde (Opinion), 19th May 2024, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2024/05/19/in-mali-democracy-has-been-indefinitely-postponed_6671934_23.html, (accessed 10th August 2025).
[19] Guinea: December (postponed) 2024 Elections, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 17th January 2024, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/2024-elections/guinea/, (accessed 10th August 2025).
[20] Dabo Alberto, Guinea‑Bissau opposition vows to ‘paralyse’ country in election timing row, Reuters, 26th February 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/guinea-bissau-opposition-vows-paralyse-country-election-timing-row-2025-02-26/, (accessed 10th August 2025).
[21] “BBC News, ‘Slavery, migration, and jihadists-the issues as Mauritania votes,’ BBC News, 4th December 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c51y81exdjlo (accessed on 8th January 2025).”
[22] “Mahamat Idriss Déby officially declared winner of presidential election,” France 24, 16th May 2024, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240516-%F0%9F%94%B4-chad-junta-chief-mahamat-idriss-d%C3%A9by-officially-declared-winner-of-presidential-election , (accessed 10th August 2025).
[23] Le Monde, ‘Senegal: A triumph, a shock, and a wake-up call,’ Le Monde, 26th March 2024, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/03/26/senegal-a-triumph-a-shock-and-a-wake-up-call_6655708_4.html (accessed on 15th February 2025).
[24] “Togo ruling party wins big parliamentary majority in boost for Gnassingbé,” France 24, 5th May 2024, https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20240505-togo-ruling-party-wins-big-parliamentary-majority-in-boost-for-gnassingbe (accessed 8th June 2024).
[25] Silas Isenjia, ”Catholic Bishops Laud South Africa’s “overwhelming” free and fair polls,” Acia Africa, 3rd June 2024, https://www.aciafrica.org/news/11063/catholic-bishops-laud-south-africas-overwhelmingly-free-and-fair-polls (accessed 15 January 2025).
[26] “Sudan Crisis Explained,” UN Refugee Agency, 27 February 2025, https://www.unrefugees.org/news/sudan-crisis-explained/#:~:text=Sudan%20has%20also%20been%20heavily,exacerbating%20food%20insecurity%20for%20families(accessed 10 March 2025).
[27] Santino Fardol W. Dicken, “South Sudan postpones elections to 2026: A move toward inclusivity and stability.” Wilson Center, 6 February 2025, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/south-sudan-postpones-elections-2026-move-toward-inclusivity-and-stability (accessed 3 March 2025).
[28] Faisal Ali, “Ethiopia and Somaliland reach historic agreement over access to Red Sea ports,” The Guardian, 1st January 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/01/ethiopia-and-somaliland-reach-historic-agreement-over-access-to-red-sea-ports (accessed 15th June 2025).
[29] “What’s Next for the Fight Against al-Shabaab in Kenya and Somalia – August 2024," ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), 4th September 2024, https://acleddata.com/report/whats-next-fight-against-al-shabaab-kenya-and-somalia-august-2024/, (accessed 10th August 2025).
[30] “Government ends extra vetting for for ID registration in borders counties”, President of the Republic of Kenya, 5th February 2025, https://www.president.go.ke/government-ends-extra-vetting-for-id-registration-in-borders-counties/ (accessed 19th August 2025)
[31] Burton, D. and Kim M. “ Muslim terrorists slaughter record numbers of Christians in central Nigeria,” Truth Nigeria, 24 June 2023, https://truthnigeria.com/2023/06/muslim-terrorists-slaughter-record-numbers-of-christians-in-central-nigeria/ (accessed 13 May 2025).
[32] Masara Kim, “Nigeria under invasion,” Truth Nigeria, 2 January 2024, https://truthnigeria.com/2024/01/christmas-massacre-led-by-3000-invading-terrorists/(accessed 13 May 2025).
[33] “Nigeria: Up to 200 Dead in Worst Killing Spree,” Aid to the Church in Need (ACN), 28th May 2025, https://acninternational.org/nigeria-up-to-200-dead-in-worst-killing-spree/ (accessed 15th June 2025).
[34] “Heroic staff save pupils as gunmen attack Catholic school at night,” Aid to the Church in Need (ACN), 2nd May 2025, https://acninternational.org/heroic-staff-save-pupils-as-gunmen-attack-catholic-school-at-night/ (accessed 15th June 2025).
[35] Chinedu Asadu, “M23 rebels seize key towns in eastern Congo as violence intensifies,” Associated Press, 16th February 2025, https://apnews.com/article/m23-rebels-congo-nyanzale-north-kivu-5ab5f58872065924343f06696c0689a4 (accessed 24th July 2025).
[36] Antoine Roger Lokongo, “DRC bishops face backlash over peace plan”, The Pillar, 24th March 2025, https://www.pillarcatholic.com/p/drc-bishops-face-backlash-over-peace (accessed 28th July 2025).
[37] 2025 Global Report on Internal Displacement (GRID), Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), 13th May 2025, https://api.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/idmc-grid-2025-global-report-on-internal-displacement.pdf, (accessed 10th August 2025).
[38] Refugee Statistics, UN Refugees (Refugee Facts), (as of end of April 2025), https://www.unrefugees.org/refugee-facts/statistics/, (accessed 10th August 2025).
[39] Wendy Williams, “African Migration Trends to Watch in 2025,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 3rd February 2025, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/migration-trends-2025/, (accessed 10th August 2025).
